





















Those of us who know war
Other than through the medium
Of the printed page;
Those of us who have seen the thing
At close range;
Who have looked deep into its bloodshot eyes
Behind the bayonet;
Who have heard its belching roar
In the guns that flamed
Their message of death
On a hundred fronts,
Have learned to hate it
With an intense and bitter hatred.
Only the soldier knows
That war is more than hell.
It is a thousand hells
In simultaneous erruption.
1
John A. Hayes, An Old Ku£Jiy Bayonet (McDonough, Georgia: Press
of the Deep South, 1951), pp. 2-3.
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This paper has had its genesis, not simply in research, but
rather in the practical experiences and serious questions raised by an
attempt to carry out a ministry within the institutional framework of the
Armed Forces. It has ccme to life in the tedium and terror of combat, as
well as the pastoral ministry posited by service with Naval and Marine
personnel ashore and at sea. It is written by one who stands at the
very fringe of the Church, at the interface between the Church and the
world. In short, it is written by one who like the Baptizer can only
point from afar to the reality of the faith, or like the centurion at the
cross, whose very confession itself is made problematical by the render-
ing of a Greek phrase. It is a word spoken from the gates. Insofar as
this paper deals with command responsibility, and that is its purpose,
it is written by one who can speak to the question only from observation
c-
and not from personal experience with the difficult, day-by-day, compon-
ents of the loneliness of that responsibility. Having expressed these
cautions, It must also be said that this paper is presented by one, who
by virtue of ordination and call, is compelled both to speak and to accept
responsibility before God for his words, and who by public law is required

to "advise the commanding officer" concerning matters of religion.
This paper is, then, an attempt to deal within* an 'ethical per-
spective with the the responsibilities of command. The trial before
Military Commission of General Tomoyuki Yamashita has been chosen as a
vehicle for this exploration, because in this first of the war trials
at the conclusion of the Second World War the primary point of contention
was the limitation and breadth within which the concept of command
responsibility should be read. As noted in the Introduction following,
the major interest is not in the legal arguments and failures embodied
in the trial, but in its ability to raise and elucidate the question of
responsibility of command.
It is with both deep appreciation and profound respect that I
acknowledge my debt to CAPT Herbert Fox Rommel, USN (RET.); LTCOL E. H.
Deptula, USMC (RET.); LTCOL J. W. Perrin, USMC (RET); CAPT L. G. "Tiny"
Graning, USN; CAPT James M. Faddis, USN; RADM David F. Emerson, USN; VADM
Emmet Tidd, USN; and CAPT John H.. Bell, USN, whose openness with a junior
member of their various staffs permitted him to gain some insight into *"
the ability and seriousness with which these officers approached their
responsibility of command.
Appreciation is also expressed to Mrs. Sara Peterson, Assistant
to the Research Librarian, Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, who
shared in the frustrations of tracking down various documents, and to
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Miss Dorothy Rountree, ray typist, who converted my scribblings into some-
thing approaching the English language. Above all, I must express my
appreciation to my wife Susan, ray reality factor, who has in love will-
ingly shared the life of a professional soldier. To her this brief
effort is dedicated.
This paper was written in conjunction with the Naval Postgraduate
Education Program under the sponsorship of the Superintendent, Naval
Postgraduate School. The interpretations and opinions expressed herein
in no way represent the official position of the Department of the Navy






At midnight of the eighth of March '1945 the war in Europe ground
to a halt. Three months later on 14 August 1945 the Emperor of Japan
accepted the terms of surrender and combat ceased. With the signing of
the documents of surrender aboard USS MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay on 2 Septem-
ber the war was, at least, unofficially over. As the lights began to go
on again all over the world, a calculation was begun of the cost of the
nightmare which had seized virtually all of mankind. Even today it is
virtually impossible to arrive at a quasi-accurate estimate of the expen-
diture of wealth and lives involved in the Second World War. This attempt
has been hindered by the partial blackout of statistical material from
the Communist nations, by the collapse of statistical collection agencies
under wartime conditions, by destruction of irreplaceable records, the r
unreliability of procedures utilized by some countries, and the difficulty
in ascertaining the number of civilian deaths directly attributable to the
war. Of the countries for which we have records, we are able to estimate
that some 8^1,000,000 men took part as combatants. Even this must be
regarded as a conservative estimate, however, because it does not include
1

figures from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece,
Hungary, and Poland. A very stringent estimate of participants from these
countries would indicate the total number of combatants in the neighbor-
hood of 100,000,000 men and women. The belligerent forces suffered
14,942,962 deaths directly attributable to battle. Estimates of the
total number of deaths, including the execution of some 5.5 million Jews,
2
vary from 35 to 60 million. A study conducted by James H. Brady of
American University, cited by the 1946 edition of the World Almanac and
Book of Facts, placed direct expenditures by Allied and Axis governments
in excess of one trillion dollars and property damage at an additional
3
231 billion dollars. These figures are, however, only statistics. They
cannot indicate the human cost of the war in terms of bereavement, the
destruction of families, the loss of potential and psychological scarring
which took place. As the shards of civilization were being swept up, the
question of explication of this overwhelming tragedy of the world arose.
How was the Second World War to be explained? How was this tragic con-
vulsion of civilization to be understood? »
Dan Golenpaul, ed. Information Please Almanac, Atlas and Year -
book. 26th ed., (Mew York: Simon and Sinister, 1971), p. 701.
2
Robert V. Coakley, "World Wars: Killed, Wounded or Missing,"
Encyc lopedia Britnnnica, 1972, XXIII, 802J.
3 Irvine E. Eastman, ed. The Worl d Almanac and Book of Facts For
.1946 (New York: The New York World-Telegram, 19A6), p. 35.

Here I differ sharply with the school of thought represented by
Freda Utley. The major war crimes trials held in Nuremberg and Tokyo
were not a simple matter of vengeance, a legal charade for the execution
of the leaders of a vanquished foe. These trials, which were much closer
to Roman Law, in which the defendent is presumed guilty, than to English
Common Law, were an attempt to make sense of the tragedy which had befal-
len mankind. In essence they were morality plays to establish in docu-
mentary form the contemporary conception of the immediately preceding
historical events. The roots of this particular interpretation and of
the trials themselves lie deep within the course of the war itself.
Eduard Benes, in an article in the Journal of Central and East European
Affairs of April 1941 suggested
As essential condition of a peace based upon really moral
principles will be a determined censuring of the barbarity and
criminality of the totalitarian regimes, and an actual, as far
as possible general, correction of all the injuries which have
been done to individuals and nations, and the political punish-
ment of those who are responsible for this war.
General Wladyslav Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland, in a speech delivered
in London on IS September 1941, predicted that "the day will come when
Hitler's hangman will pay for their crimes." Replying to a statement
made by Franklin Delano Roosevelt on 25 October 1941, concerning atro-
cities coLxiitted by the Germans, Winston Churchill added that "retribution
*Freda Udley, Th?. Ht.-h Cost of; Vengeance (Chicago: Henry Regncry
Company, 1949), pp. 162-181.

for these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major
purposes of the war." Hubert Pierlot, Prime Minister of Belgium,
speaking in London on 21 February 1942, said,
Exemplary punishment to fit the greatness of the crime is a
satisfaction urgently demanded by the conscience of the
oppressed peoples, by their need for justice as well as their
desire for security.
Vyacheslav M. Molotov on 27 April 1942 gave expression in Moscow to
Soviet feeling in the following words:
The Hitler Government and its accomplices will not escape the
stern responsibility and deserved punishment for all their
unheard of crimes committed against the people of the USSR and
against all freedom-loving peoples.
Sumner Welles, then Under Secretary of State, speaking in Arlington,
Virginia, on 30 May 1942, said
I believe that these voices of the men who will make our victory
possible will demand that justice be done, inexorably and
swiftly to those individuals, groups, or peoples, as the case
may be, that can truly be held accountable for the stupendous
catastrophe into which they have plunged the human race.
Anthony Eden, then His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
stated in a speech delivered at Leamington on 26 September 1942
«
-
Daily, new crimes are added to the list. We are resolved that
they shall not go unpunished. We are not animated by a spirit
of revenge, natural though such must be to many in Europe, but
by the conviction that civilized justice will be restored to
its rightful place only when the criminals who have sought to
destroy it are made to answer for their deeds. Retribution must
be swift, sure, and complete.
Similar thoughts were expressed by Pietcr Gerbrandy, Prime Minister, The
Netherlands; General Charles de Gaulle, then President of the French

National Committee; and Eelco N. Van Kleffers, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
The Netherlands. It was the .general consensus, not only that Germany
had started the war, but that she had done so unjustly and in violation
of international law. Secondly, it was felt that the decisions leading
up to the war were the decisions of men and that these men could be held
personally accountable for those decisions.
This consensus was given formal expression, first in terms of
responsibility for criminal acts, in a joint declaration signed by
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin issued by the Foreign Secretaries at the
Moscow Conference. This document contained a solemn warning that
. . . those German officers and men who have been responsible
for or have taken part in the above atrocities, massacres and
executions will be sent back to the countries in which the
abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged
and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries
and of free governments which will be erected therein.
This declaration, the document goes on to explain is
. . . without prejudice to the case of German criminals, whose
offenses have no particular geographical localization and who
will be punished by a joint decision of the governments of the
Allies. 6
United Nations Information Office, War and Peace Aims : Extracts
from Statements of United Nations Leaders , Special- Supplement No. 1 to the
United Nations Review, 30 January 1943, pp. 29-33.
Henry Steel Commager, ed. , Documents of American H istory (5th cd.
;




In a progress report submitted to President Truman on 6 June 1945,
prior to the Potsdam Conference, Justice Robert H. Jackson, who was later
to become the chief United States prosecutor at Nuremberg, argued that
Our case against the major defendents is concerned with the
Nazi master plan, not with individual barbarities and per-
versions which occurred independently of any central plan.
Later in the same report he maintained
Unless we write the record of this movement with clarity and
precision, we cannot blame the future if in days of peace it
finds Incredible the accusatory generalities uttered during
the war. He must establish incredible events by credible
7
evidence. . . .
Article VI of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg incorporated in an agreement signed on 8 August 1945 by
representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the prosecution and punishment
of major war criminals established three categories of crimes.
Harry S. Truman, Year of Decision, Vol. I of Memoirs (2 vols. :
Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday &'Company, Inc., 1955), p. 313. See also
Robert H. J3ckson, The Numbers Case (New York: Cooper Square Publishers,
Inc., 1971; originally published New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947)
and Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis
Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D. C. : United
States Government Printing Office, 1948). The latter is, in the words of
its subtitle, "a Collection of Documentary Evidence' and Guide Materials
Prepared by the American and British Prosecuting Staff." The official
English language text of the proceedings against the major defendents at
Nuremberg is the Trial of the Ma jor War Criminals Before the International
Mil Itary Tribunal , Nuremberg. 14 November 194 5--10 October 1946 , published
at Nuremberg in 42 volumes between 1947 and 1949.

(a) Criraes against peace: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging a war in violation of international
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War Criraes: namely, violations of the laws and customs
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
again3t any civilian populations, before or during the war;
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated."
Article VII of the Charter specifically disallows the defense argument
that official position as Head of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments should be considered as freeing the defendents
from responsibility for Acts of State or mitigating punishment, a defense
which Justice Jackson referred to in his report to President Truman as "a
9
relic of the doctrine of the divine right of kings."
The defense of action pursuant to order of Government or superiqr
authority is disallowed by Article VIII, but is permitted to be judicially
noted for consideration of mitigation of punishment.
o
Leon Friedman, cd. , The: Lnw_ of Wnr : A_ Documentary History (New
York: Random House, 1972), "Prosecution and Punishment of European Axis,
August 8, 1945," pp. 886-7.
9
Truman, p. 312. .<•

The selection of defendents for the trial of major war criminals
was intended to be representative rather than exhaustive. Those tried
included high government officials, party officials, diplomats, senior
military personnel, propagandists and an industrialist. The selectivity
and representative character defendents is illustrated in the discussion
concerning substituting Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach for his
father when it was determined that the latter had become too senile to
10
stand trial. In addition to the individuals designated as defendents,
action was taken against specific organizations, which were held respon-
sible as "corporate persons" for various alleged offenses listed in the
indictment. These organizations included Die Reichsreqierung (Reich
Cabinet), Das Korps Per Politischen Leiter Per N.S_.D.A_.P. (the Leadership
Corps of the Party), Die Schutzstaf feln Per N.S.D.A.P. (SS), Die
Sicherheitzdienst (SD), Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo), Die
Sturraabteilungen Per N.S.D.A.P. (SA), and the General Staff and High
Command of the Armed Forces.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, issued on 19 January 1946 by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, follows the Nuremberg charter
in its definition of crimes which come under the purview of the Tribunal.
Eugene Davidson, The Trial of t he. Cermans (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1968), pp. 26-27.

Again the selection of defendants was intended to be representative.
The primary interest of both of these tribunals was the assess-
ment of responsibility for the waging of an aggressive war. The legal
concept of conspiracy, which is rooted in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and
unfamiliar to practioners of Roman law, became a key focal point. Richard
H. Minear in a study of the Tokyo trial indicates five fundamental ques-
tions of international law which played a significant role in the trial,
and in which the state of the law was at the very least uncertain and
debated by experts. The concept of conspiracy had not arisen prior to
Nuremberg. The issue of individual responsibility for acts of state was
admitted even by the prosecution as an innovation. This concept had been
specifically rejected by the United States representatives in Versailles
in 1919. As late as 1944 the United States was unwilling to regard
aggressive warfare as a crime in the legal sense. Both the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Charters advance definitions of crimes which had not previously
been recognized, violating the concept of nullum crimen sine le^e, nulla
11
poena sine le.^e and resulting in virtual ex_ post facto legislation.
The concept of negative criminality (failure to prevent a crime) had been
repudiated by the United States in 1919, but was to play a significant
Unless there is a law, there can be no crime; unless there is




role in both Nuremberg and Tokyo. 12 The principles of international law
formulated by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters were adopted by the United
13
Nations General Assembly on 11 December 1946. In 1950 the International
Law Commission formulated the principles of Nuremberg which offer the most
complete set of guidelines currently available on the relationship between
14
personal responsibility and war crimes. This formulation has yet to be
r
officially adopted.
Thus the movement during the war appears to be from criminal
responsibility for "conventional" war crimes to responsibility for the
act of war itself. Additionally, the concept of "personal" responsibility
and, therefore, of accountability was distinctively heightened. Holotov's
reference to the "criminal deeds of the Hitlerites," and the employment of
"gangster"-referant language, as well as Winston Churchill's classic
description of the "madman on a bicycle" may be taken as indicative of the
general mood- of the Allied Nations at the end of the war.
Richard H. Minear, Victor's Justice : The Tokyo War Crimes Tr ial
(Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 72.
J United Nations General Assembly Resolution 95 of 11 December
1946, Resolution Affirming th? Principles of Law Racor.nir.ed by the Charter
of the Nu-,:e-,-ibarg Tribunal in Friedman, pp. 1027-28.'
+See appendix 1.
United Nations Information Office, p. 32.
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Against this heightened background of personal responsibility for
crimes of war the Yamashita case should be viewed. William Ruddock, an
officer attached to General MacArthur's Judge Advocate General Staff
summed up the primary issue in a dinner conversation with Frank Reel.
Yamashita is being charged as a war criminal because his men
violated the laws of war. . . . They have nothing on him at
all. They're trying to establish a new theory--that a com-
manding officer is responsible if his troops violate the laws
of war, regardless of whether he ordered the violations or
even knew of them. Under such a principle, I suppose even
MacArthur should be tried.
The nub of the case revolves around the concept of "negative criminality."
In the sixty-four counts of the bill of particulars and the fifty-nine
additional counts in the supplemental bill, there is no allegation
that Yamashita either personally committed, directed or ordered the com-
mission of any of the offenses. It is the contention that as commander
it was incumbent upon him to insure that such offenses did not occur or,
in the event of their occurrence, to take prompt and effective action
against the perpetrators. In demonstrating personal responsibility it
becomes critical that the commander has effective responsibility for the
units involved, knowledge of the alleged events, and some degree of possi-
bility of effecting the course of actions. It has, been the purpose of
this introduction to develop the historical framework within which this
concept was discussed during the course of the trial and to explore the
A. Frank Reel, The Cn".e of General Yamashita (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1%9), p. 3.
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mind-set with which both the prosecution and the defense had to deal.
General Yamashita was tried by a United States Military Com-
mission convened by Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer, USA, acting
under the authority of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. The Com-
mission found General Yamashita guilty as charged. On 23 February 1946
he was stripped of all indications of military rank and honor and hanged
in disgrace. In confirming the awarding of the death sentence, General
MacArthur wrote in part:
This officer, of proven field merit and entrusted with a high
command involving authority adequate to his responsibility,
has failed this irrevocable standard; has failed his duty to
his troops, to his country, to his enemy, and to mankind; he
has failed utterly his soldier faith. ^
The thrust of General MacArthur' s remarks in this order underline the
emphasis which he placed upon the concept of "duty," which is defined
elsewhere in this same order as "protection of the weak and unarmed" and
"sacrifice." In so writing, however, he also indicates that a relationship
Order of General Douglas MacArthur Conf irmino; Dsath Sentence "of
General Tomovuki Yamashita, February
_6_, 1946 in Friedman, p. 1593. Military
Lav; differs significantly from civil law in that the court martial, or
military commission, is called into being by a "convening authority," who
has administrative responsibility for the personnel involved in the par-
ticular allegations. The members of the court/commission, as well as the
prosecution and defense are appointed by the officer holding this authority.
It is his responsibility to review the findings of the court/commission,
and is empowered to reduce, but not increase, the severity of the sentence.
This authority is not analogous to the appelate process of civil law,
provision for which is also found in military jurisprudence.
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exist between the military commander and four definable groups of people--
the troops under his personal command, his country, his enemy, and man-
kind. It is this personal responsibility and these relationships with
which this paper seeks to deal.
In examining these relationships it will be the intent of this
study to view them within the framework of a Christian perspective.
Chapter II will examine the trial of General Yamashita and the appeal of
the results of this trial to the Supreme Court of the United States, in
order to ascertain the critical events and decisions and to assay their
ethical import for the concept of command responsibility. Chapter III
will sketch briefly the particular ethical presuppositions which pro-
vide the framework for a consideration of command responsibility. Chapter
IV will examine, in turn, each of the relationships defined by General
MacArthur from this perspective.
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the legal points
at issue, except insofar as they impinge upon the ethical substructure.
Nor is it the intention of this paper to comment upon the conduct of the
trial itself or to arrive at stated opinions concerning the guilt or
innocence of General Yamashita.

CHAPTER XI
IN THE MATTER OF YAMASHITA1
At approximately two o'clock in the afternoon on the 2nd of
September 1945 on a dusty mountain road near the High Commissioners
Palace in Baquio, Mountain Province, Philippine Islands, General
Tomoyuki Yamashita, Commanding General 14th Imperial Japanese Army, and
his party were taken into custody by a detachment of Military Police
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aubrey Kenworthy. The "Tiger
of Malaya" had been brought to bay. In company with General Yamashita
were his Chief-of-Staf f , Lieutenant General Akira Muto, Admiral Denhite
Okochi, Major General Naokata Utsunomiya, Rear Admiral Kaoru Arima, Com-
mander Yamamoto, Lieutenant Colonel Nakahara, Lieutenant Colonel Kuriya,
The primary documentary sources for the trial of General Yamashita
are the original record of trial, Unite d States vs_ Tomoyuki Yamashita ,
Washington National Record Center, Suitland, Maryland (Hereinafter
referred to as TR) ; Adolf Frank Reel, Tha Case of General Yamashita
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Supreme Commander For The
Allied Powers, Government Section, "The Case of General Yamashita: A
Memorandum by BGEN Courtney '/hitney," Far Eastern Law Section, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. J LTCOL Aubrey Saint Kenworthy, The Ti^cr of
Malaya : The_ Story of General Tomoyuki Yamashita and "Death Mirch " General





Captain Futaki, and various supporting personnel. General Yaroashita and
his party vere held overnight at the High Commissioners Palace.
Formal surrender ceremonies were held at 11:45 on 3 September.
Shortly before the designated time General Yamashita, accompanied by
Admiral Okochi, General Muto, Admiral Arima and two Japanese interpreters
were escorted into the dining room of the Palace and seated on one side
of a long table. On the other side of the table, to receive the
surrender was Major General Edmond Harrison Leavy, Special Representative
of Lieutenant General William D. Styer, Commanding General, American
Forces Western Pacific Area. General Styer and Major General Johathan M.
Wainwright, who had surrendered all Allied Forces in the Philippines to
the Japanese in May 1942, were to General Leavy's right. To his left were
General Sir Arthur Percival, Commanding General of the British Empire
Forces during the siege and fall in Singapore in February 1941, and
General Wood3, serving as Clerk of the Conference. General Woods read in
English the surrender instrument, a translation of which had previously
been made available to the Japanese officers. After being signed by each
of the Japanese officers, the Document of Surrender was passed to General
Leavy to sign on behalf of the United States Army. The fountain pen used
by all the; officers was presented to General Wainwright. The toLal
elapsed time for the surrender ceremonies was sixteen minutes, at the
conclusion of which the Fourteenth Imperial Japanese Army ceased to exist.
Lieutenant Colonel Kenworthy was directed to assume custody of General
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Yamashita and his party as prisoners of war and convey them to a place of
safekeeping until relieved by competent authority. At three o'clock that
afternoon General Yamashita and his party were flown to Manila and then
taken by convoy to New Bilibid Prison in Montelupen, Rizal Province,
approximately twenty miles southwest of Manila.
On the 1st of October, less than a month after his surrender,
General Yamashita was charged as a war criminal on orders from General
MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Forces Pacific, whose Headquarters
were now in Tokyo. The function of conducting the trial was delegated to
Lieutenant General Styer as Commander Army Forces Western Pacific, the
subechelon which had been given jurisdiction over military installations
in the Philippines. By his order, dated 1 October 1946, a Military
Commission was appointed to conduct the trial and prosecution and defense
staffs were established. As members of the Military Commission General
Styer selected Major General Russel B. Reynolds as President and Law
Member, Major General Leo Donovan, Major General James A. Lester, and
Brigadier Generals Egbert F. Bullene and Morris G. Handwerk. Mot a single
one of these General Officers had held combat command or had legal experi-
ence. Major Robert Kerr and Captains D. C. Hill, M. D. Webster, William
N. Calyer, and Jack M. Pace served on the prosecution staff. Major
Glicerio Opinion, a Philippine national, was added to this staff to pro-
vide Philippine participation. The defense staff consisted of Colonel
Harry E. Clarke; Lieutenant Colonel James D* Fcldhaur., who was hospital!
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for a major portion of the trial; Major George F. Guy, who was absent
interviewing character witnesses for the defense for the first month of
the trial; Lieutenant Colonel Walter Hendrix, Captain Milton Sancberg,
and Captain Adolf Frank Reed. At General Yamashita 's request General
Muto and the Assistant Chief-of -Staff , General Utsonomiya, were appointed
as associate counsel in order to provide during the course of the trial
records and facts with which they alone were conversant. Masakatsu
Hamamoto, a graduate of Harvard Class of 1927, General Yamashita 's per-
sonal interpreter, was also permitted to accompany him into the court
3
room.
The arraignment took place 8 October 1945 in the former residence
of the United States High Commissioner on Dewey Boulevard overlooking
Manila Bay. The charge drawn against General Yamashita was short and to
the point. It reads as follows:
Toraoyuki Yamashita, General Imperial Japanese Army,
between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, at Manila and at
other places in the Philippine Islands, while commander of
armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America
and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge
his duty as commander to control the operations of the members
of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against the people of the United States and of
its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines, and
he, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, thereby violated the laws of war.
2Headquarter J), United States Army Western Pacific Special Order
No. 112 Of 1 October 1945.
TR, pp. 27-29. *TR, p. 31. -

18
In connection with the charge a hill of particulars contaning sixty-four
counts was furnished by the prosecution. The bill alleged murder,
massacre, rape, and pillage of innocent noncombatant civilians in Manila
and various other places; mistreatment, starvation, and murder of
American prisoners of war and civilian internees; and wanton devastation
and destruction of public, private and religious property. Late Friday
evening (26 October) before the scheduled opening of the trial on Monday,
29 October, a messenger delivered to the defense a supplemental bill of
particulars containing fifty-nine additional counts. The bill of partic-
ulars and its supplement mention General Yamashita only in the opening
paragraphs of each. Nowhere within these bills is it alleged that he
either committed or directly ordered the cciiraission of the specified
crimes.
Tomoyuki Yamashita was born 8 November 1885 in Shikocu, Japan, a
village located on the upper reaches of the Yoshina River. The son of
a country doctor, he did not follow in his father's footsteps, as did his
elder brother. Instead, he matriculated in the Hiroshima District Military
See appendix 2.
The following account is based on a biography drawn up at the
request of the defense by General Muto and translated by Hamamoto (Reel,
pp. 57-6'J); a letter from General Muto to LTCOL Kenworthy dated 19 May
1946 (Kenworthy, pp. 14-21); and Yamashita ' s testimony before the Military
Commission (TR, pp. 3519-2671).
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School and ultimately the Cadet's Academy In Tokyo. Graduating with high
honors, he was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry in the
Japanese Army in 1908, three years after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1911
he was appointed to the staff of the infantry school. From 1914 to 1917
he attended the army staff school, followed by a tour of duty with the
General Staff. In 1919 he was transferred to the War Ministry where he
remained for eighteen years, except for special assignments in the United
States and Europe, including a short period as military attache' in Austria.
General Muto draws a distinction between the General Staff, whose primary
responsibilities lay in the area of military operations and command, and
the War Ministry, which was responsible for negotiating matters of budget,
personnel, and equipment with the civilian government and was thus more
susceptible to influence by popular opinion. Yamashita served as a mem-
ber of the War Affairs Section, dealing with mobilization and budget,
from the time that he was a Captain until his attainment of the rank of
Colonel in 1929. At that time he became chief of the section. While a
member of this organisation, he was involved with the development of the"
Ugaki plan for the reduction of personnel and armament, an action which
brought him into disfavor with a large segment of the high command.
Yamashita was promoted to Major General in August 1934 and in
1936 left the War Ministry to command an infantry brigade in Korea. He
was promoted to Lieutenant General in November 1937 and served as Chief-
of-Staff, llorth China Expeditionary Force in 1938 and Commanding General,
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4th Division, then located in Manchukuo, in 1939. In 1940 he was
appointed as Inspector General. of Aviation, but held the post for only a
short time before being ordered on a six months inspection tour of Europe
by General Tojo. Tojo was criticised for this action because it was
interpreted by nany as an effort on his part to remove Yamashita from the
Tokyo political scene. Upon Yaraashita's return, he reported that unless
Japan immediately effected far-reaching improvements in the areas of air
and mechanized warfare, communications, engineering, and chemical warfare >
she could not hope to meet the requirements of modern warfare. In September
1941 he was suddenly transferred to the comparatively unimportant post of
defense commander of the Kvangtung array in Manchukuo.
The following month he was placed in command of the 25th Imperial
Japanese Army and, at the outbreak of war, was responsible for operations
in Malaya and the capture of Singapore. Yamashita opposed more than
80,000 British and Australian troops at Singapore with a force numbering
about 30,000. Concerned that the British would discover his relative
weakness and not desiring to become engaged in costly street fighting^he
insisted, during a meeting with General Percival in the teller's cage of
a suburban bank, upon a cease fire at six o'clock that evening (15 February
1942). General Percival demurred, requesting until eight o'clock the
following morning. During a long interchange between the harried Japanese
interpreter, whose command of English was minimal, and General Percival,
Yamashita interrupted, demanding a simple "Yes" or "No" answer • Newsmen
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outside the teller's cage, speaking no Japanese, saw only Yamashita's
shaking finger and heard the demand for a "Yes" or "No." The legend of
the ferocious conqueror, the "Tiger of Malaya," was born. Acclaimed as a
hero in Japan, he was not permitted by the Army high command to return to
his homeland for recognition of his achievement or presentation to the
Emperor.
During 1942, he served as Supreme Commander in Malaya and then
was transferred to serve as Commander at Timor, Netherlands East Indies.
Because of political antipathy on the part of the To jo cabinet, Yamashita
was then ordered to an unimportant assignment in Manchukuo.
7
Here a minor confusion develops in the sequence of events.
Collier' s Encyclopedia, 1961 ed., s.v. "Yamashita" reads, "in World War
II he had charge of the Malayan campaign which ended in Singapore s cap-
ture in February 1942. He served as commander-in-chief of Japanese
forces and chief of military administration in Malaya and Sumatra.
Yamashita then assumed command of Japanese forces in the Philippines and
captured Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor in the spring of 1942." The
Columbia Encyclopedia , 3rd ed. , s.v. "Yamashita" says, "in March, 1942,
he relieved Homina in the Philippines and took Bataan and Corregidor." A
contemporary account ("Quiet R.oom in Manila" Time, November 12, 1945,
pp. 21-22) refers to him as this "Beast of Bataan," a term normally associ-
ated with Ceneral Komma. These accounts place Yamashita in the Philippines
much too early. All historical accounts that I have consulted hold General
Homma as Commander of the 14th Imperial Japanese Army at the time of the
fall of Bataan and Corregidor. Honma was later placed on trial for the
famed "Death March." Kenworthy (pp. 41-43) lists General Mas3haru Homraa
in command of the 14th Army, which had primary responsibility for the
Philippines, from 1941 until August 1942. Homma was relieved of cor.rmand
on orders from General Tojo and returned to Japan where he served as Vice-
President of the Philippine Society of Japan. Relieving General Homma
was General Shijuichi Tanaka, who remained in command until he contacted
a serious case of malaria and was forced to return to Japan in April 1963.
Lieutenant General Shi^cnori Kuroda assumed command on 5 May 19A3. He was
relieved by Yamashita on 9 October 1944.
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After the fall of Saipan in July 1944, the Tojo cabinet resigned
en bloc. With the fall of Peliliu and the approach of the American
forces to the Philippines the situation became critical for Japan. It
was under these circumstances that Yamashita was ordered to the command
of the 14th Imperial Japanese Army. Ke departed Manchukuo on 27 September
1944, remaining in Tokyo just long enough to exchange his heavy uniforms
for tropical clothing. His orders were only to relieve Lieutenant General
Kuroda, a task which encompassed the defense of the Philippine Islands
against the threatening American attack. He was subordinate to the
Supreme Southern Commander, Field Marshall Terauchi, whose headquarters
was then in Manila. Field Marshall Terauchi, jointly with the Japanese
ambassador, retained control over all political and economic affairs.
General Yamashita arrived in Manila on 7 October 1944, immediately
to be confronted by an impossible comaiand situation. The defense of the
Southern Philippines was entrusted to the 35th Army (roughly 100,000 men)
under the command of Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki. This force was
under General Yamashita 's control. The 14th Army under Yamashita' s direct
command consisted of approximately 120,000 troops. In addition, there
were operating in the area, but not subject to Yamashita' s command, Army
Air Force personnel (60,000), Naval Forces (65,000), Reserve units belong-
ing directly to the Imperial General Headquarters or to the Supreme
Southern Command (30,000), and Special Water Transport Units (10,000). A
significant portion of the military personnel in the Philippines had to

t 23
be employed in small detachments throughout the area for the preservation
o;f peace and order. The sudden expansion of the Japanese Army had led to
a deterioration of both personnel and equipment. This was compounded by
the long and debilitating service in a tropical climate which these units
had experienced. A large number of the men available were casuals, men
who had suffered the discouraging experience of having their transport
sunk from under them. The defense plan prepared by General Kuroda was
virtually worthless. Supplies, particularly rice and petroleum products,
were scarce and unsystematically scattered over the islands. With estab-
lishment of American air supremacy daytime movement became almost impos-
sible. Of General Kuroda's staff only three officers remained to assist
with the transition of command, thereby destroying any institutional
memory available to him. General Muto was ordered in as Chief-of-Staff
at this time, but, 15.ke Yaroashita's other staff officers, was totally
unfamiliar with the tactical situation in the Philippines.
The American attack on Leyte began on 18 October 1944. General
Yaroashita's orders indicated that primary responsibility for meeting the
attack would rest with the Navy and Air Force. His army personnel would
merely "co-operate" with those branches as the need arose. The one divi-
sion stationed on Lcyte and regiments scattered on nearby islands of the
Visayan group were considered satisfactory for dealing with the threat.
On 22 October Ynmasbita wis suddenly directed to send the greatest troop
strength available to Leyte. Since this involved a fundamental alteration
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in his battle plan, it was with the greatest difficulty that he endeavored
to respond. Assembly of personnel, equipment, and supplies; procurement
and co-ordination of transportation; and tactical considerations, all in
the face of incessant and highly effective harassment by United States
Naval and Air units, demanded the utmost command concentration. On 7
December American forces landed at Ormac on the inner side of the island,
bringing the possibility of effective resistance to an end.
On 17 November Field Marshall Terauchi left Manila for Saigon.
In December Yaraashita gained control of the forces assigned to the
8
Southern Command. On 1 January he was given command of the 4th Air
9
Army. On 5 January he gained limited tactical control "when engaged in
land operations" over Naval personnel. Gradually, during January and
February, he succeeded to the conimand of the various maritime forces.
With the fall of Leyte General Yamashita turned his primary
attention to the defense of Luson. Realizing that it would be impossible
to force a decisive battle against the highly mechanized United States
forces, Yamashita opted for a holding operation based primarily on the
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1. The Americans were expected to land at Lingayen Bay with
their main forces in the early part of January, while attempt-
ing at the same time, with minor forces, to land at Batangas
and Bataan promontory with the object of marching on Manila
City. It was also considered possible that an attempt should
be made to land at Aparri or to occupy Cagayan Valley with
parachute units.
2. , The Japanese forces were to draw back upon three main
positions, the first in the hilly district east of Manila, the
second in the mountains x-jest of Clark Field, and the third
around Baguio and Balete Pass, all three groups co-ordinating
their operations in such a way as was best calculated to
restrain the American forces rushing on towards Manila and
thereby to retard their ultimate employment in the attack upon
the mainland of Japan or elsewhere.
3. One detachment was to be sent to Batangas peninsula to
check the enemy's march on Manila.
4. One Army corps was to be dispatched to the vicinity of
Aparri to stop the enemy's landing and to secure the Cagayan
Valley.
5. The City of Manila was to be left outside the zone of
battle. 12
The decision to leave the city of Manila outside the battle zona
is of critical import for the trial. Yamashita advanced three reasons
for this decision. The population consisted of approximately one million
people and the logistical burdens of feeding them would overwhelm his,
already strained supply system. The buildings ware highly inflammable
and would constitute an additional hazard to the defenders. The terrain
is flat, requiring a tremendous ratio of strength to defend it. To
this we might add Yamashita 's demonstrated reluctance to engage in costly
12 n
Kenvjorthy, p. 18. TR, p. 3527.
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street fighting. Yamashita issued an order in mid-December 1944 for the
abandonment of Manila during the course of the next six weeks. All but
fifteen or sixteen hundred Japanese Army troops, who were left to guard
military supplies, were removed from the city. In addition to these
troops there were twenty thousand naval personnel under the command of
Rear Admiral Iwabuchi remaining in the city. Late in December Yamashita
moved his headquarters from Fort McKinley, on the outskirts of Manila, to
Baguio, a city high in the mountains of northern Luzon. With the move
from Manila Army Group Shimbu (i.e., "mixed") under the command of
Lieutenant General Yokoyama was activated. The mission of this army group
was to effect the evacuation of Manila and to carry on defensive warfare
from the hills east and south of the city. IThen the naval forces came
under Yamashita's control on 5 January they were attached to this army
group and came under the direction of the evacuation order.
On 9 January American forces under the command of Lieutenant
General Walter Krueger landed atLingayen Gulf against minor opposition.
The first counterattack did not develop until the evening of the 10th' and
it became apparent that Yamashita did not plan to seriously contest the
entire Central Plains-Manila Bay area. By 11 January all communication
between Manila and Yamashita's headquarters in Baguio were cut off, except
for radio traffic. Even the latter, the defense was to maintain in the
trial, bec.-iue problematic because of decreasing gasoline supplies for
££.» P« 3527. Discussed in Reel, p. 22.
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generators and deteriorating vacuum tubes and batteries. On 4 February
United States forces entered the city of Manila. Contrary to General
Yaraashita's intention heavy fighting occurred in Manila itself, centering
primarily south of the Pasig River in the main business district. The
streets were rained, barricaded and covered by antitank guns. The ancient
walled city of the Spaniards, Intramuros, was a particularly fortified
strongpoint. The primary defenders were the naval personnel, reinforced
by Army security forces ccramandered by Rear Admiral Iwabuchi. It was not
until 13 February that Yamashita learned that the naval force was still
in Manila. At that time Yamashita ordered Lieutenant General Yokoyama
to direct Rear Admiral Iwabuchi to withdraw from the city. Iwabuchi
either refused to obey the order or was incapable of doing so.
Yaraashita's attempted rescue mission on 14-15 February was repulsed and
the section of the capital in which fighting was taking place was reduced
to rubble before it was finally secured on 4 March. Thousands of civilians
died during the course of the battle, many from atrocities committed by
the Japanese. It was here that the most vicious atrocities took place,
including rape and ritual murder, that weighed so heavily against Yamashita
17during the trial. From all indications those military personnel were
Kenworthy, p. 20. Reel, p. 24.
7
See items 14-18, 20, 34-39, 41, 48, 50-53, 60-64, 68, 93, 95,
97-101, 103, and 104 of the Bill of Particulars and Supplemental Bill of
Particulars, appendix 2. .-
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completely out of control.
A great deal of speculation has centered on Rear Admiral Iwa'ouchi's
remaining in Manila. Both Reel and John Toland call attention to an
extant naval order, issued by Vice Admiral Denshichi Okochi, Iwabuchi's
immediate Naval superior,.:to destroy all port facilities and naval
storehouses.
During his testimony before the Military Commission, Admiral
Okochi was asked
Q. Did you have command of any naval personnel operating
in the Manila area after zero hours January 6, 1945?
A. I was in command as far as Naval Administration was
concerned.
Q. Who was in tactical command of the troops?
A. The orders came from the Army.
Q. You told him (RADM luabuchi) Navy land operation from
then on were to be under the command of the Army, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir. 20
Q. Could General Yamashita supersede any order of yours
as to other than land operations?
21
A. No. No, except those of land operations.
There follows a discussion of the order for the destruction of harbor
22facilities and docks. Admiral Okochi was then asked
Q. Do you believe that Admiral Iwabuchi may have delayed
his withdrawal because he had not yet completed the destruction of
the harbors, docks and supplies?
23
A. Maybe there is something to that. That is my opinion.
18
Reel, p. 24; and John Toland, The Risiu,?, Sun (New York: Random
House, 1970), p. 677.
19 ?0 ?l 99




Faced by a conflict in orders, Reel argues that it is normal to assume
that Iwabuchi would choose to obey the directives of the Naval Ministry
rather than those of a local army commander. Since Manila Harbor is one
of the finest ports in the Western Pacific and could easily be utilized
for support of operations, particularly against the Japanese home islands,
its destruction was of paramount concern to the Navy. With the oblitera-
tion of Iwabuchi and his force in the liberation of Manila, this appears
to be as close as we will be able to come to a definitive answer to the
question. This, of course, does not excuse his loss of control over his
force.
A second series of events of paramount concern for the trial are
those centering around the treatment of alleged guerrillas. 2 The evi-
dence supports the allegation that a number of forays were planned and
executed with the specific purpose of dealing with the threat of guerrilla
activity, especially in Batangas Province. On 11 October 1944 Yamashita
issued a written order to his subordinates directing the "'subjugation'
of 'arrned_ guerrillas. ''' ' The use of the term "armed" is of particular
significance here. Article I of the Annexed Regulations of Hague IV
24See appendix 2. Many items of the Bill of Particulars and the
Supplemental Bill of Particulars dealing with Batangas Province and other
places, detailing the murder and massacre of civilians and the deliberate
and wanton destruction of private, public and religious property, have




defines a belligerent force as one commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates, having a fixed visible emblem recognizable from a
distance, carrying arms openly, and conducting operations in accordance
with the laws of war. Article XLI specifies that "a violation of the
terms of (an) armistice by private persons acting on their own initiative
only entitles the injured party to demand the punishment of offenders or,
if necessary, compensations for the losses sustained." Article L forbids
the infliction of a general penalty on a population for "the acts of
individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally
responsible." Armed combat by men who neither wear uniforms nor dis-
tinctive emblems and who operate secretly in civilian guise is outlawed
by the rules of war. Punishment, however, could only be directed against
the guerrillas themselves and not against the population in general or
selected representatives of the population.
To demonstrate the magnitude of the problem confronted by
Yamashita it is necessary to cite only two incidents. When the American
forces landed at Lingayen Bay, there was a great deal of concern over'a
reported Japanese minefield blocking the bay. Naval minesweepers were
unable to locate a single rains. During the two month period between the
landing on Leyte and that at Lingayen, Filipino guerrillas, under the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) of 18 October 1907"
,in Friedman, pp. 308-/'7.
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command of Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann, had removed over 350
mines, disassembled the horns, boosters, and detonators, scooped out the
explosive for use against the Japanese, and converted the cases into
washtubs. The second incident occurred on the morning of 29 January.
Lieutenant A. F. Tadena of the guerrillas was able to inform Rear Admiral
Arthur D. Struble, commander of the Attack Group off San Antonio, near
Subic Bay, that the entire area was already in friendly hands and that
the Stars and Stripes had been raised on the beach. The airstrip at nearby
San Marcel ino had been seized by the guerrillas three days earlier in
27
anticipation of the "invasion."
The normal procedure used by the Japanese in a guerrilla-infested
area followed several patterns. Most often the inhabitants of a barrio
were herded into the church or other large building. They were ordered
to leave through one exit. A Filipino collaborator would then point out
those involved in guerrilla activity or suspected of rendering aid to the
guerrillas. Execution was ordinarily by sword or bayonet to conserve
ammunition. Punitive raids on villages suspected of harboring or other-
wise aiding guerrillas often resulted in indiscriminate slaughter. Colonel
Fujishige, in command of troops in Batangas Province, readily admitted to
issuing orders "to kill all persons who opposed the Japanese, including
27
Walter Karig, Russell L. Harris, and Frank A. Hanson, Battle




'even women and children."'"" The question arises as to the extent of
moral guilt adhering to a military commander whose subordinates execute
a military mission with fanatical thoroughness and ferocity beyond the
limitation of orders received.
A third group of incidents consists of mistreatment and execution
of prisoners of war. The most famous occurrence during the war in the
29
Philippines was the so-called "Palawan incident." ' In December, 1944,
one hundred fifty-one American prisoners of war were being used as a
labor battalion for the construction of an airfield on the island of
Palawan. On 14 December, fearful of air attack, the Japanese ordered all
of the prisoners into air raid shelters, poured gasoline over them and
ignited it. Some of the men burned to death. Those fleeing the flames
were met by a hail of machine gun bullets. Nine of the prisoners of war
30
escaped by swimming five miles to another island. Here was a clear cut
violation of the Geneva Convention of 1929.
To cite this incident against General Yamashita, however, as was
done during the trial, begs several important considerations. The '
28Reel, p. 110.
^See item 9 in appendix 2.
Reel, p. 115. This allegation is supported by a number of af fa-
davits included among the exhibits furnished by the prosecution and accep-
ted by the Co-.umission as a part, of the Trial Record.
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perpetrators of this particular incident were members of the Array Air
Force. At the tine that the massacre took place, 14 December 1944, the
Army Air Force operating in the Philippines was not yet under his command.
As indicated earlier, General Yamashita did not gain control of Air
Forcie. personnel until 1 January 1945.
Those incidents maintaining mistreatment of prisoners of war,
particularly with relation to the amount and quality of food provided,
would have to be adjudicated on the basis of comparison of the food avail-
able to the Japanese for their own use. Integral to the question from
the command point of view would be the provision of direct inspection and
31
supervision to insure equitable distribution.
The trial of General Yamashita opened on 29 October 1945. Sen-
tence was passed on 7 December, the fourth anniversary of Pearl Harbor.
Testimony was given by 286 people in eleven languages or dialects. The
trial record runs 4,055 pages. A total of 423 exhibits were submitted,
including official documents of the United States Government and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, affidavits, captured enemy documents',
diaries of Japanese personnel, photographs, a propaganda film, and Manila
newspapers. With few exceptions there is little contention by either side
concerning the truth of the testimony, that the atrocities happened as
31
See items 2, 4, 6-3, 13, 67, 69, 73-76, 83, 86, 87, 89, 106, 109




described before the Commission, or that such were properly construed to
be war crimes. The point at issue, simply stated, is "What does this
have to do with General Yamashita?" To what extent could he be held
accountable and criminally responsible for these events? How far does
command responsibility extend and what factors might legitimately be seen
as limiting it?
32
Major Kerr in his presentation of the prosecution's case* argued
that the crimes detailed in the Bill of Particulars and the Supplemental
Bill were so extensive and widespread, both as to time and to area that
they must have either been willfully permitted or secretly ordered.
Orders issued by subordinate officers, presented during the course of the
trial, as well as direct testimony of the officers involved, demonstrated
that they at least had ordered the execution of civilians under the
guise of eliminating guerrilla activity. Concerning civilian internees
and prisoners of war, Major Kerr argued criminal neglect. The major
point at issue here was the failure of higher command to detect and pre-
vent cruel and inhuman treatment accorded by local commanders and guards.
Summarizing his argument, Major Kerr said
We contend, sir, that the evidence also shows clearly,
conclusively, that during that period of time the Accused did
unlawfully disregard and fail to discharge his duty as such
commander to control the operations of his command and that ha





and other high crimes against people of the United States and
its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines.-^
The question then arises, was the Accused responsible
for the acts of those troops which he commanded, the acts which
resulted in these atrocious crimes?
The crimes having been committed, the atrocities having
been established, of course the next question is, Who is responsi-
ble?
V7e contend that clearly under the laws of war, under
international law, the commanding officer of those troops, who
was in the theater, who owed the admitted duty to control
those troops so that they would not commit those acts, is
responsible.
Concerning command of the Naval forces involved in Manila, prosecution
argued that Manila was a land operation in every sense of the word and
i
35
that the troops were therefore under Yaraashita s tactical control.
36
In the defense summation Colonel Clarke argued
The evidence adduced by the Prosecution, therefore,
does not establish that General Yaraashita or his headquarters
issued orders directing the commission of the atrocities set
forth in the Bill of Particulars, nor does it establish that
General Yamashita had any knowledge thereof, nor that General
Yamashita or his headquarters permitted the commission thereof,
nor that under the circumstances then existing General Yamashita
unlawfully disregarded and failed to dishcarge his duties as
Commanding General of the 14th Area Army in controlling th.i
operations of the members of his command, thereby permitting
them to commit atrocities. »
In its finding the Military Commission pointed out
This accused is an officer of long years of experience,
broad in its scope, who has had extensive command and staff duty
J




in the Imperial Japanese Army in peace as well as war in Asia,
Malaya, Europe and the Japanese Hone Islands. Clearly, assign-
ment to ccmnand military troops is accompanied by broad author-
ity and heavy responsibility. This has been true in all armies
throughout recorded history. It is absurd, however, to consider
a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers
commits a murder or rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape
and vicious revengeful actions are widespread offences, and there
is not effective attempt by a commander to discover and control
the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even
criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, depending
upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them. Should
a commander issue orders which lead directly to lawless acts, the
criminal responsibility is definite and has always been so under-
stood. The Rules of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10, United
States Army, are clear on these points. It is for the purpose
of maintaining discipline and control, among other reasons, that
military commanders are given broad powers of administering mili-
tary justice. The tactical situation, the character, training
and capacity of staff officers and subordinate commanders as well
as the traits of character, and training of his troops are other
important factors in such cases.
The Commission concluded that a series of atrocities and other high crimes
had been committed by members of General Yamashita's command; that they
were not sporadic in nature, but in many cases were supervised by Japanese
officers and noncommissioned officers; and that during the period in
question he failed to provide effective control of his personnel as
39 • •
required by circumstances. The Commission found him guilty as charged
and sentenced him to death by hanging.
Concurrent with the trial, another drama was being enacted.
38.
.
Decision of the United States Military Commission at Manila,
December 7, 1945," in Friedman, pp. 1596-98.
39 Ibiu., p. 1598.
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Feeling that trial before a Military Commission did not serve to protect
General Yaraashita's civil rights, the defense filed a writ of habeas
corpus with the Supreme Court of. the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
the court having original jurisdiction. Several issues were argued by
the defense before the Court. The original contention was that the charge
failed to specify a violation of law by the accused. The argument was
<-
that command responsibility had not been so construed in the past, and to
define it as was being done by the prosecution amounted to virtual ex
post facto legislation. Additionally, defense argued that since the
Philippines were liberated, that all combat operations had ceased, and
that local courts were open and functioning in an area where the United
States exercised sovereignty, Yamashita should be tried by civilian court
and not by military commission. Thirdly, defense argued that notice of
not less than three weeks before commencement of the trial had not been
given to Switzerland, serving as the protecting power for Japan, as
required by the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 relative to prisoners
of war. Finally, defense argued against the right of the Commission to .
receive in evidence affidavits, depositions, opinions of the prosecutors,
gossip, hearsay, and sound films. The defense cited the twenty-f if th
Article of War, forbidding reception of even the more formal depositions
in a capital case (one in which the death penalty may be adjudged) and
the twenty-eighth Article of War, which delegates authority to the
President of the United States to establish -rules of evidence for military

38
tribunals. The Philippine Supreme Court demurred in interfering with
41
the conduct of the trial by the Military Commission.
A petition for certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme
Court. When the death sentence was announced, the defense feared that it
would be executed bafore the Supreme Court could act on their petition.
They, thereupon, sent the following unprecedented cablegram:
GENERAL TOMOYURT YAMASHITA SENTENCED TO HANS. IT
IS FEARED SENTENCE WILL BE EXECUTED BEFORE COURT CAN ACT ON
PETITION FOR T.filIT OF HABEAS CORPUS NCW BEFORE COURT AND ON
PETITION FOR WRIT CERTIORARI NOW ENROUTE TO YOU. WE URGENTLY
REQUEST COURT TO ORDER SECRETARY OF WAR TO STAY EXECUTION
UNTIL COURT CAN ACT ON BOTH PETITIONS. 42
Colonel Clarke, Captain Reel and Captain Sandberg, of the original
defense staff, argued the case before the Supreme Court. They maintained
that the military tribunal was not the proper forum in which to try
General Yamashita, that he had not been found guilty of an offanse pre-
viously defined as being in violation of the laws of war, and that under
the rules of evidence accepted by the military commission, General Yamashita
43 . 44 45had bean denied a fair trial. In a 6 to 2 decision, In_ Ra_ Yamashita,
4Q
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the Supreme Court upheld the sentence. Writing the majority opinion
Chief Justice Stone answered the defense contentions point by point. On
the question of the right of military commission to try the petitioner
after cessation of war between the United States and Japan, he cited an
46
earlier decision of the Court, Ex. parte Quirin, which recognized the
"military commission" appointed by military command as the "appropriate
tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war."
48 49Citing Article 15 of the Articles of War and the Espionage Act of 1917,
he pointed out that
the provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military
commissions ... or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military
commission.
He also held that
In the present cases it must be recognized throughout that the
military tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by the Articles
46317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Friedman, p. 1600.
48 10 U.S.C., paras. 1471-1593.
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of War are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made
subject to review by this Court.
Next, Justice Stone turned his attention to the question of
authority to create the commission and its right to try Yamashita. Con-
cerning this he wrote
The Congressional recognition of military commissions
and its sanction of their use in trying offenses against the
law of war to which we have referred, sanctioned their creation
by military command in conformity to long established American
precedents. Such a commission may be appointed by any field
commander, or by any commander competent to appoint a general
court-martial, as was General Styer, who had been invested with
that power by order of the President.
The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have
committed violations of the law of war is thus not only a part
of the conduct of war operating as a preventive measure against
Ibid. The thrust of this argument is that military tribunals
are "tribunals whose determinations are reviewable by the military author-
ities either as provided in the military orders constituting such tri-
bunals or as provided by the Articles of War." "Congress," he points
out, "conferred on the courts no power to review their determinations
save only as it has granted judicial power 'to grant writs of habeas
corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of the restraint of
liberty.'" He then goes on to say, "if the military tribunals have
lawful authority to hear, decide, and condemn, their action is not sub-
ject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision
on disputed facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for
the courts but for the military authorities which are alone authorized
to review their decisions." He cites as precedence for this ruling F.x
parte Vallandiaham. 1 Wall. 243, 17 L.Ed, 589; In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126,
21 S. Ct, 48, 45 L. Ec. 118; and Ex parte Quirin. This, of course, does
not remove from the courts the right to inquire into the authority of a







such violations, but as an exercise of the authority sanctioned
by Congress to administer the system of military justice recog-
nized by the law of war.-'-'
The extent to which the power to prosecute violations of the
law of war shall be exercised before peace is declared rests,
not with the courts, but with the political branch of the
Government, and may itself be governed by the terms of an armis-
tice or the treaty of peace. Here, peace has not been agreed
upon or proclaimed. Japan, by her acceptance of the Potsdam
declaration and her surrender, has acquiesced in the trials of
those guilty of violations of the law of war.-'
The defense had maintained that the charge presented no violation
of the law of war specifically attributable to General Yamashita. The
Court here found the gist of the Charge to be an unlawful breach of duty
in permitting personnel under his command to commit the atrocities speci-
fied.
The question then is whether the law of war imposes on
an army commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as
are within his power to control the troops under his command
for the prevention of the specified acts which are violations
of the lav? of war and which are likely to attend the occupation
of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether
he may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure
to take such measures when violations result. That this was the
precise issue to be tried was made clear by the statement of the
prosecution at the opening of the trial. -'-'
Citing Hauge IV of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929, the opinion of
the Court continues
These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who
at the time specified was military governor of the Philippines,
53Ibid., p. 1603. 54Ibid., p. 1604. 53 Ibid., p. 1605.
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as well as commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative
duty to take such measures as were within his power and
appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war
and the civilian population. This duty of a commanding offi-
cer has heretofore been recognized, and its breach penalized
by our own military tribunals. 56
The Court, therefore, concluded that, tested by any reasonable standard,
the Charge did adequately allege a violation of the law of war within the
competence of the Commission to try.
In response to the defense contention that the rules of evidence
adopted by the Commission (i.e., the introduction of depositions, affi-
davits, opinions of prosecutors, etc.) precluded a fair trial, the Court
engaged in an extremely intricate rendering of Articles 2, 12-15, 25 and
38 of the Articles of War. The gist of the Court's opinion was that the
Articles of War created one form of military commission, but that the
commission was competent to try two classes of people. To the first class,
which included, among others, members of our own military forces, the
rights and provisions of Article. 2 applied. The second class, which the
Court held to include enemy combatants, could not claim the benefits of
Article 2. 57
Justice Murphy and Justice Rutledge dissented from the opinion of
the Court. In his opinion Justice Murphy saw the primary issue before the
Court as a question of the procedural rights of an accused person as




guaranteed by the Constitution, especially with reference to the due
process clause of the fifth Amendment.
The answer is plain. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of
due process of law applies to 'any person' who is accused of a
crime by the Federal Government or any of its agencies. No
exception is made as to those who are accused of war crimes or
as to those who possess the status of an enemy belligerent.
Concerning the right of the Commission to try Yaraashita and the nature of
the Charge on which he was tried, he wrote
A military commission was appointed to try the petitioner
for an alleged war crime. The trial was ordered to be held in
territory over which the United States has complete sovereignty.
No military necessity or other emergency demanded the suspension
of the safeguards of due process. Yet petitioner was rushed to
trial under an improper charge, given insufficient time to pre-
pare an adequate defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the
most elementary rules of evidence and summarily sentenced to be
hanged. In all this needless and unseemly haste there was no
serious attempt to charge or to prove that ha committed a recog-
nized violation of the laws of war. He was not charged with
personally participating in the acts of atrocity or with order-
ing or condoning their commission. Not even knowledge of these
crimes was attributed to him. It was simply alleged that he
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as com-
mander to control the operations of the members of his command,
permitting them to commit the acts of atrocity. The recorded
annals of warfare and the established principles of international'
lav; afford not the slightest precedent for such a charge. This
indictment in effect permitted the military commission to make
the crime whatever it willed, dependent upon its biased view as
to petitioner's duties and his disregard thereof, a practice rem-











Justice Rutledge, in his dissent, reluctantly took issue with the
majority of the Court on a number of issues. This trial was, in his view,
an historical and legal novelty.
This trial is unprecedented in our history. Never before
have we tried and convicted an enemy general for action taken
during hostilities or otherwise in the course of military opera-
tions or duty. Much less have we condemned one for failing to
take action. The novelty is not lessened by the trial's having
taken place after hostilities ended and the enemy, including the
accused, had surrendered. Moreover, so far as the time permitted
for our consideration has given opportunity, I have not been able
to find precedent for the proceeding in the system of any nation
founded in the basic principles of our constitutional democracy,
in the laws of war as in other internationally binding authority
or usage. . . . The proceedings in this case veer so far from
our time-tested road signs that I cannot take the large strides
validating them would demand.
Justice Rutledge then argued that even if the provisions of Articles
25 and 38 of the Articles of War were not binding by their own force as
acts of Congress, they would still be applicable by virtue of the terms
of Articles 60 and 63 of the Geneva- Convention of 1929. With Justice
Murphy, he held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment was
applicable to this case. *
The proceedings of the trial were reviewed by General Styer as the
convening authority and by General MacArthur. On 6 February 1946 General
MacArthur signed an order confirming the death sentence of General
63
Yamashita. As noted in Chapter I, MacArthur found that Yamashita had
60 lbid.
> p. 1618. Ibid., p. 16?9.
62 lbid., pp. 1622-23.
' Douglas MacArthur, Rom in is en co r, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1964), pp. 295-96.
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"failed his duty to his troops, to his country, to his enemy, to man-
kind." In his review of the case of General Homma, issued on 21
March 1946, General MacArthur reflected on the minority opinions expressed
by Justices Murphy and Rutledge. "The rules of war and the military law
resulting as an essential corollary therefrom," he wrote, "have always
proven sufficiently flexible to accomplish justice within the strict
limitations of morality." Throughout this order General MacArthur dis-
plays a marked antipathy toward the technical rules of evidence normally
accepted by courts.
At 1:30 A.M. on the morning of 23 February 1946, Yamashita,
Colonel Seichi Ohta, a former Commanding Officer of the Kernpetai, and
Takuraa Higashiju, a civilian interpreter convicted of torturing Filipinos,
were taken to a rehabilitation camp at Los Banos. Dressed in an Army
fatigue uniform, stripped of all medals and indications of rank, General
Yamashita walked up the 13 steps of the scaffold. He reportedly voiced
66
a wish "for the Emperor s long life," and was hanged at 3:02 A.M. Ohta
was hanged at 3:41 A.M., and Higashiji at 4:17 A.M. The bodies ware t
67
buried at Los Banos in three unnamed, but numbered graves.
Ibid., p. 295. 65Ibid., p. 297.
66




In the last written statement before his execution, which we
have only in a very poor translation, Yamashita said:
I don't ashame (sic) in front of God for what I have
done when 1 have died. But if you say to me, "You do not
have any ability to command Japanese Army," I should say
nothing for it, because it is my own nature. Now our war-
criminal trial going on in Manila Supreme Court, so I wish
to be justify under your kindness and right.
I know that all you Americans and American military
affairs officers always have tolerance and rightful judgment.
... I never forget what they have done for me, even if I
have died. I don t blame my executioners. . . .
I thank you. 63
Was General Yamashita guilty as charged? This is a question which
is still debated among practitioners -of military law. Do considerations
of the technical rules of evidence take precedence or should we follow
the opinion expressed in the New Republic, "Yamashita was in charge of
operations in the Philippines, and if he did not know what was going on,
,.69
he should have.
General Courtney Whitney in his memorandum, written in response
to the proposal to have Reel's book translated and published in Japan,
draws an interesting parallel between the trial and British and Canadian
military regulations. Regulations 10 (3) (4) and (5) of the War Regula-




"l Think You," Time , March 4, 1946, p. 23.
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Where there is evidence that a war crime has been the
result of concerted action upon the part of a unit or group
of men, the evidence given in any charge relating to that
crime against any member of such unit or group may be received
. as prima facie evidence of the responsibility of each member
of that unit or group for that crime.
Given the tenor of the times and hearing, day after day, witnesses
relate the brutal events which they had suffered, it would have been diffi-
cult to achieve the dispassionate weighing of evidence demanded of a
court of law in the case of General Yamashita. The outcome of the pro-
ceedings was not as simple a case of "lynch-mob justice" as Reel would
have us to believe in his well-argued presentation of the defense. There
are a number of factors directly related to command responsibility aris-
ing from the Yamashita trial.
One of the most fundamental issues is the extent of knowledge
that Yamashita had of the events detailed in the Bill of Particulars and
its Supplement.
'if those crimes were committed, ' Yamashita insisted,
'i positively and categorically affirm that they were against
my wishes and in direct contradiction to all ray expressed orders,
and, further, if they were committed, they occurred at a place
and at a time of which I had no knowledge whatsoever. '71
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Supreme Commander For the Allied Towers, Government Section,
"The Case of General Yamashita: A Memorandum by BGEN Courtney Whitney,"





With the achievement of air supremacy and, later, with control of the
lines of communication between Yamashita's headquarters and subordinate
units, United States forces compelled his dependency on radio coir,nunica-
tions. It was argued, during the course of the trial, that these were
faltering and unreliable, because of the lack of gasoline for generators
and deteriorating vacuum tubes and batteries. An examination of the
communications logs, if they were in existence at the time of the trial
would have given some indication as to the extent of contact held with
subordinate units. That some contact was indeed maintained would seem
to be indicated by the fact that he was able to contact General Yokoyama
in the Manila area on 13 February, and that Yokoyama was, in turn, able
to establish contact with Admiral Iwabuchi in Manila. It must be remem-
bered, however, that with the deteriorating tactical situation almost all
radio traffic would be concerned with operational matters of the highest
urgency. The second factor involved in the process of con-jnunications is
the filtering which takes place as information moves from one level of
command to another. It is not reasonable to expect that a subordinate
commander will notify his superior that he is about to take action con-
trary to the express wishes of that superior or to inform him of such
actions after the event, unless there is, in the subordinate's opinion,
valid mitigating circumstance. Thus the command is to some extent iso-
lated and dependent for information upon the decisions of his sources.
The question of knowledge then devolves into two critical lssues--the
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knowledge available to the command upon which decisions are made and
courses of action determined, and the responsibility of command to seek
out information within the limits permitted by the tactical situation.
Thus the responsibility for knowledge of events derogatory to the preser-
vation of good order would be different for a command operating under
peace time conditions and one operating under the pressure of tactical
considerations. It would, in my opinion, be necessary, in order to estab-
lish moral responsibility, to demonstrate knowledge of the events in
question or responsibility for such knowledge. Did the command in ques-
tion have such knowledge? Should it have? Could it have? This is the
order in which the questions should be raised.
The second fundamental issue raised by this particular trial
involves command and control. It must be remembered that this was a
deteriorating tactical situation. The decision made by General Yamashita
to revert to a holding operation in the mountains appears to have been
strategically correct in consequence of Japan's needs at that particular
stage of the war. It is specifically this typs of situation, however,
that von Clausewitz notes as most restrictive to the powers of the com-
mandar to exercise control and requiring the highest degree of self-
reliance on the part of subordinates. "in mountains he has too little
command over the separate parts and the direction of all is beyond his
72
powers. . . . " At what point, the question arises, does a superior
Carl (Karl) von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham, Intro,




commander no longer have effective control of his force. The relation-
ship between Yamashita and Iwabuchi may be taken as an example. That
Yaaashita was in operational control of the force commanded by Iwabuchi,
insofar as it was engaged in land operations, appears to be established
by testimony before the commission. By 13 February, however, Iwabuchi
either was unable or chose not to respond to directions from Yanashita.
The question then arises as to the extent that Yamashita might be held
morally culpable for subsequent actions of a force over which he no longer
exercised effective control. At what particular time he lost control of
the unit is a moot point. That he did not have effective control during
the final hours of fighting in Manila seems to be established from the
record. The issue here is at what point does moral responsibility for
events pass from the senior in command to subordinate commanders. It
would be argued, in the light of the Yamashita trial, that it doss so at
that point when the senior no longer has effective control over the force
involved.
A subsidiary question involved in this issue is that of the »
enforcement of the wishes of the command upon a subordinate commander.
In order to retain responsibility at the command level, the United States
Armed Forces permits, within limitations, the removal of a subordinate
"for cause" and "not for cause." This does not seem to have been the case
in the Japanese Army. Whan charges of mistreatment of civilians were
brought against Colonel Hagahamma, Commander, of the Kempetai (Military
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Police), Yamashita sought to replace him. The request for his removal
had to be submitted to the War Ministry via the Supreme Southern Commander,
whose headquarters were then in Saigon. It was not until 1 February that
73
he was replaced by Major General Masuoba. ' Such tenuous control over
subordinates would appear to be detrimental to the function of command
discipline. The commander, by virtue of his dependence on his subordin-
ates, must have the power to remove those in whom he no longer has confi-
dence.
A third issue raised by the Yamashita case having direct bearing
on command responsibility is the amount of time that he had to effect
changes in the command to which he succeeded. Yamashita relieved General
Shigenori Kuroda on 9 October 1944. In describing Kuroda, Kenworthy says
Kuroda was not considered a strong character and had
a rather bad reputation among the Filipinos as well as among
the Japanese nationals residiiig in the Philippines. It is
alleged that he spent a large part of his time drinking and
consorting with rather questionable people. +
If we can take at face value General Muto and General Yamashita' s descrip-
tions of the state of the Army upon Yamashita' s arrival, coupled with* the
fact that within a matter of days Yamashita was compelled to make basic
alterations in his concept of battle with the change ordered in his role






of effecting far-reaching changes in the posture of his force. This,
too, must be considered as a mitigating factor in the moral culpability
devolving upon Yamashita. It would appear that a share of the responsi-
bility must be apportioned to General Kuroda.
To be in command is to be responsible. Over the last few pages
we have discussed the events leading up to the trial of Yamashita, some of
the significant ground covered in that trial and its aftermath, and have
attempted to point up some of the issues which have import for command
responsibility. Now we may ask, to what extent Christian ethics can
illuminate the wider context of command responsibility. Before we can
turn our attention to this question, however, we must briefly outline the




A DEFINITION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
Dietrich Bonhoeffer maintains in the opening paragraph of his
fragmentary Ethics that "the knowledge of good and evil seems to be the
aim of all Christian ethics." If this is true, then the whole science
of ethics is based on a fundamental irony; for the search of man for the
knowledge of good and evil is the basis of the Fall of man in the Genesis
narrative. It is this fundamental irony, the wry smile that it directs
to all discussion- of man's goodness, that makes the study of ethics so
appealing. It immediately calls into question the possibility of the
existence of Christian ethics as a "speculative" discipline, and renders
it to some extent chimerical, and most certainly critical in nature.
To attempt to construct a general theory of ethics in a paper of
such limited scope, as is this, would be both impossible and presumptive*
In order, however, to give consideration to the question of command responsi-
bility within a Christian context, it is necessary ,to outline some of Che
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, cd. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Neville
Horton Smith (New York: Nacmillan Company, 1955), p. 17.
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major dynamics and parameters of Christian ethical thought and to indi-
cate, briefly, their relationship to the question of V7ar. The structure
of Christian ethics is intimately related to the structure of dogmatics
itself, and to adequately describe the course of ethical thought it will
be necessary to deal responsibly with the factors of separation, judgment,
grace, the formation of community, and responsibility in community.
Since the knowledge of good and evil, which Bonhoeffer perceives
as the objective of ethical reflection, is intimately related to the fall
of Man and reflects his separation from God, insofar as it strives after
such knowledge ethical reflection is a continuation of this separation.
For this reason, in Bonhoeffer 's words, ethical reflection, "must be
2
invalidated." It is only with reluctance, he points out, that the Bible
discusses God Himself as the One who knows good and evil. The usurption
of this knowledge by man in order to become "like God" resulted in man's
"becoming a god against God," or it can be expressed, as McGeachy does
in The Gospel According to Andy .Gapp, "1. Man is created in the image
5 *
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In his construction of a metaphysics of moral responsibility,
Immanuel Kant moves this separation to the very center of the "categori-
cal imperative." The principle of autonomy is to him the "sole principal
of morals; for by an analysis of the concept of morality it is shown
that "its principle must be a categorical imperative and that the impera-
tive commands neither more nor less than this very autonomy." Kant then
defines will as the causality of living things and introduces the concept
of freedom as that property of causality which can be effective independ-
ently of foreign causation. By this negative definition of freedom, he
sought to rescue human activity from a mechanistic determinism. Flowing
from this negative definition, he found a positive concept of freedom,
which though not established by pure reason, could be elucidated by prac-
tical reason.
Since the concept of causality entails that of laws
according to which something, i.e., the effect, must be estab-
lished through something else which we call cause, it follows
that freedom is by no means lawless even though it is not a
property of the will according to laws of nature. Rather it
must be a causality according to inmutable laws, but of a
peculiar kind. Otherwise a free will would ha an absurdity.
Natural necessity is, as we have seen, a hetercnomy of effi-
cient causes, for every effect is possible only according to
the law that something else determines the efficient cause to
its causality. What else, then, can the freedom of the will
be but autonomy, i.e., the property of the will to be a la-.; to
itself? The proposition that the will is a law to itself in
Irnmanuel Kant, Critiqua of Pr-ict.lr.nl !' | in r:}n]_ Oj
in Moral Philosophy, trans, and cd. Lewis White beck (Chicago: Uni<
of Chicago Press, l'J49), p. 97.
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all its actions, however, only expresses the principle that
we should act according to no other maximum than that which
can also have itself as a universal law for its object. And
this is just the formula of the categorical imperative and the
principle of morality. Therefore a free will and a will under
moral laws are identical.
As Beck points out in the introduction to his compilation of Kant's moral
teachings, this method of arguing that freedom is the ratio esscndi of
morality is in its turn the Copernican revolution effected by Kant in the
field of morals, comparable to his distinguishing the proper fields of
man as knower and as known in the realm of critical philosophy. Insofar
as man exists as a rational being, he exists as a sovereign being. As
a sovereign being, he gives law to himself, which subjectively is trans-
lated into respect for law. Action which is done from respect for law,
and thus is an attestation of his freedom, is the "key to the universality
and necessity of moral precepts, which would be variable and contingent
9
if they depended upon particular ends." Freedom, then, is the determinant
of moral responsibility. Here Kant raises a critical issue for ethics,
which once again illuminates the 'fundamental irony of ethical reflection.
If man is not autonomous in his actions, if he is not capable of acting
in freedom from external causality, he lapses into a mechanistic determin-
ism, and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for his actions. If he
7
Ibid., p. 102. Ibid., p. 14,
9 Ibid., p. 21.
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operates in freedom, in complete autonomy, he is totally responsible for
his actions, but that freedom in which he operates is a freedom over
against God; for man, qua autonomous man, exists in separation from God.
This separation, or autonomy, is, as Brunner describes it "the original
..10
source of all sin. I have deliberately structured the issue in this
way in order to move the discussion from the field of philosophical to
theological ethics, with due apologies to the virtual unfairness which
it represents to the seminal thought of Kant. Man is not morally responsi-
ble except in so far as he acts in freedom, and by acting in freedom,
qua man, he places himself in opposition to God. Before continuing our
consideration of this question, however, we would explore some of the
concomitants of this separation.
In the past the account of the Fall in Genesis has too often been
treated as a metaphysic of the origin of evil. The opening words of the
.,11
chapter The serpent was more subtle than any other creature would
indicate that it is the intention of Scripture to completely by-pass the
question of the origin of evil. From a reading of the context of the 'book
of Genesis in which the Fall narrative fits, it would appear that the
intention of these first, prchistorical chapters is, to demonstrate the
Emil Brunner, The D ivine Imperative
, trans. Olive Wyon





inextricable spread of corruption of the good, which had been created,
throughout the totality of the physical world (spatially) and through-
out the extent of human relationships.
Bonhoeffer describes man in his separateness from God as the
experience of "shame." Shame is defined as "man's ineffaceable recol-
lection of his estrangement from the origin; it is grief for this
estrangement, and the powerless longing to return to unity with the
12
'-'
origin." The existentialist school of novelists and playwrights,
centering primarily on Sartre, have explored this conception of separa-
tion at great length and often revert to emotional expressions which
somewhat parallel Bonhoeffer 's concept of shame. As Camus expresses it
in The Fall, "Ah mon cher , for anyone who is alone, without God and with-
out a master, the weight of days is dreadful. Arthur Wilier has
Quentin say in After- the Fall
That I was moving on an upward path toward some elevation-
God knows what--I would be justified, or even condemned--a verdict
anyway. I think now that my disaster really began when I looked up
one day--and the bench was empty. No judge in sight. And all that
remained was the endless argument with oneself --this pointless »
litigation of existence before an empty bench.
12Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 20.
13
Albert Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Random
House, Vintage Books, 1963), p. 133.
14
Arthur Miller, After the Fall (New York: The Viking Tress,
.Bantam Book, 1965), pp. 4-5.
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Sartre's use of the terra "nausea" (La Nausee) both in his first novel in
1938 and in his discussion of the Body as Being-For-Itself in L'Etre et
le nean t, i.nsofar as it expresses a reaction to the contingency or facti-
city of existence, carries some of the same emotional import as does the
concept of shame.
Shame, according to Bonhoeffer results in a twofold reflexive
action: concealment and exposure.
Shame implies both a positive and negative attitude to
man's disunion, and that is why man lives between covering and
discovering, between self -concealment and self-revelation,
between solitude and fellowship.
It is a reflection of the concealment and confession of the Fall Narrative,
which appears to be inherent in man in his separation from God. Adam,
knowing the difference between good and evil, can no longer stand before
his Creator. Having transgressed his limits, he denies it and becomes
like God, without a limit.
But just as in shame he reluctantly acknowledges the
limit of the other person, so he unwillingly agrees with God
his Creator by fleeing from him, by hiding from him. -7
It is to this concept of concealment from God that Bonhoeffer attaches
the idea of conscience. Rather than being a "voice of God," the conscience
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 306-39.
16
Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 22.
17
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, trans. John C. Fletcher
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), p. BO,
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perceives the separation from God and allows man to feel secure in his
hiding place. "Here distant from God, man plays the judge himself and
just by this means he escape's God's judgment."
The second concomitant of man's separation from God is the des-
truction of community. Immediately, in the Fall Narrative there is a
19
destruction of the relationship between man and wife and expulsion from
20
the Garden into the world. This is followed by destruction of the
21 "" 99
family and continued to the corruption of the entire human community.
In spite of the almost total destruction of the world, the corruptive
23
effects of man's separation from God hardly paused, ultimately result-
0/
ing in the "scattering" of the entire human community. Bonhoeffer
points out that with sin, and its related autonomy, ethical atomism
enters into history. The original "form" of community continues to exist
but it is a corruption of itself.
The original community of love, as the repose of wills
in mutual action, is destroyed when one will exchanges the move-
ment of love for an egocentric movement. And it is of the
nature of the situation that the one who sees everyone around
him abandoning the unbroken community and adopting an egocentric *
direction should himself take the same direction, for he sees
that his own movement towards community is empty, and without
response.
1 o 1 q onx Ibid., p. 81. ^Genesis 3:12. Genesis 3:24.
Genesis 4:8. Genesis 6:5. Genesis 9:20.
Genesis 11 :3.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Communion of Saints (New York: Har|
and Row, Publishers, L963), ;•. 81i
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To be responsible man must exist in freedom, but to exist in
freedom means to stand in opposition to God and under the judgment of God.
This is the krisis of man's existence. From the very moment that man
begins to ask the moral question, ignominy lies in wait for him. In his
very striving after the good "man. makes sjhiowreck and cannot save him-
self." He condemns himself to death by his question about the good,
"because the only certain answer is that he, man, is not good, and from
27
the viewpoint of the good is powerless." It is through the very ines-
capability of this doom, the "No" of God's judgment upon the totality of
the affairs of men that we come upon the reality of God standing over
against human existence. The judgment of God is inextirpable. Amos,
the first of the prophets to commit his message to writing, gives warning
no
to the children of the covenant, "Prepare to meet your God."' In his
exegesis of the Day of the Lord, he not only makes clear that man's meet-
ing with God is a meeting in judgment (the Day of the Lord is a day of
darkness and not of light), but also that it surrounds man and ultimately
engulfs him. It is "as if a man fled from a lion, and a bear met him? or
,,09
went into the house and leaned against the wall and a serpent bit him.
2%arl Barth, "The Problem of Ethics Today" The Word of Cod
the Word of Man, trans. Douglas llorton (London: Hoddor and Stoughton
Limited, iy2U), p. 163.
27 2S ?Q
Ibid., p. 167. Amos 4:19. Amos 5:18-19.
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Finally, like the remnant of a plague-infested city, man can only say
"HushJ We must not mention the name of the Lord," lest we call his
30
attention to us. As Bonhoeffer points out in the Ethics, man is formed
in the likeness of the Crucified, and this means to be under the sentence
of God.
In his daily existence man carries with him God's sentence of
death, the necessity of dying before God for the sake of sin.
With his life he testifies that nothing can stand before God
save only "under God's sentence and grace.
If we understand the Sermon on the Mount correctly, its thesis and demand
is contained in its concluding words of chapter 5, "You, therefore, must
32
be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." The sentence of God,
thus, stands not simply over against the sinfulness of man, but against
the totality of man's existence insofar as it resides in separation from
God. Karl Barth, following St. Paul, can pronounce the judgment of God
against man's very religiousness.
Religion compels us to the perception that God is not to be found
in religion. Religion makes us to know that v;e are competent to
advance no single step. Religion, as the final human possibility,
commands us to halt. Religion brings us to the place where we
must wait, in order for God to confront us.
30 31 19
Amos 6:10. Bonhoeffer, Ethics
,
p. 81. J*Matthew 5:43.
33
"Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Kdwyn C. Hoskji




It is "precisely at the point when action arises from the purest motives,
when the most pious and selfless deeds are performed" that the danger is
the greatest, that this very act is the "ungodly antithesis to the will
of God which resembles the will of God to the point of being indistinguish-
34
able from it.' The Pharisee is condemned not for wrong-doing, for there
is no indication in the parable that Jesus intended to present either His
actions or motives in any other than the most pristine purity, but because
He would justify Himself.
Man stands under the judgment of God and in his existence (Old
English: conversation) experiences the "No." 1 of God. "The ring of cause
and effect," we would say with Barth, "is completely closed." Yet, this
very circle may "be both closed up and sustained by the incomprehensible
35
, mercy of God." .Through Jesus Christ the krisis under which man stands
can be both negation and affirmation, both death and life. It is for
this reason that Barth can interpret the lav; as a form of the gospel.
"God's judgment in his commandment, the essence of all temporal rcaliza-
37
tion of his decree, is essentially identical with reconciliation. At
the moment when man recognizes the krisis of his existence, \;hen he turns
^Bonhocffer, Ethics
, p. 48. Barth, Romans , p. 7.'>.
3C J.bid., p. 69.
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to "hate evil and love good," he is confronted by the perhaps.' which
rests at the heart of the writings of the prophet Amos, "it may be that
O Q
the Lord, the God of hosts, will be gracious to the remnant of Joseph."
Under the judgment of God, man can only wait for God to speak the next
word in the conversation of existence.
It is here, precisely at the point at which no action of man can
effect the outcome, that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to
39
/Jr
Himself. 1 ' The Crucifixion, to which man was conformed through Christ
under the sentence of God, is superceded by the Resurrection, through
which in conformity to Christ man is raised up to newness of life. The
exploration of this theme is the genius of the Reformation. In the
establishment of the p_rp_ nobis of the Resurrection, Luther sees as the
40
beneficia of Christ that the freedom of man is established. Here and
only here the problem of freedom necessary to responsibility and autonomy
over against God is resolved. Man becomes a free being in Christ. This
is the sole basis for moral action before God. It is from this stance,
or within this context that man is able to live. "lie who through faifh
„41
is justified shall live. Cood, then, in the radical sense in which
Amos 5:15. II Corinthians 5:19.
40
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it is employed in Scripture is not a question of "doing good," but of
/ o
"being good." Life is lived, out in dependence upon God, not in search
43
for God.
The reconciliation between God and man is a reestablishment of
community. Just as sin had systematically destroyed the network of
relationships in which man exists, so it is the function of reconcilia-
tion to reestablish these relationships. This is what God is doing in
the world and it is this context which establishes the realm of activity
of the Christian. That this activity is exemplified in the Church, as
the Sanctorum Communio of which Bonhoef fer has so ably written, is only
the partially visible activity of God which embraces the totality of
the world. It is for this reason that the Church is only the most visi-
ble manifestation of what Paul Lehraann refers to as the "political
„44
activity of God, that the line between the Church and the world is so
inexplicit, the one shading into the other.
Uithin the formation of community, the reestablishment of relation-
ship between God and man, and between man and man through God, man himself
is brought into being as truly human. Outside of the community there is
no true humanity, and it is into this community, this process of humaniza-
tion that man is called into being as a new creature. It is this issue of
Brunner, p. 163. '"Ibid., p. 77.
44
Paul Lchmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 83, 85.
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humanization which Dr. Lehmann holds to be the decisive issue of Christian
ethics. 45
How does a Christian exercise responsibility within the community?
This raises the question of principles and rules, and ultimately the use
of the law of God. What is man's relationship to the "ought." Much of
the debate on this particular Issue in the Lutheran communion has centered
around the question of the "third use" of the law ( tertius usus legis).
air-
Calvin held that no man could argue that the law is superfluous for
believers, "since it does not stop teaching and exhorting and urging them
to do good. ..." Luther, in many ways seems to have held to much the
same view in his sermon on Good Works though recognizing the freedom in
Christ from the demands of the law. The controversy came into sharp focus
through the teaching of Johann Agricola and Otto of Herzberg. In the
Altenburg colloquy of 1563-69 adherents of the latter advanced, among
others, the theses that "the Law does not teach good works, nor should it
be preached in order that we might do good works," and "a believing
Christian is above all Law and all obedience." This position was rejected
in the Negative of Article Six of the Formula of Concord . In the Affirmative
theses the Formula contends that insofar as the believer has been redeemed




Calvin, Institutes III: XIX, 2.
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be preached to the believer as well as to the unbeliever. Since regen-
eration and renewal is incomplete in this world, it is necessary that
the law of God constantly light the way of the unbeliever in his stru;;".^
against the flesh. Finally, the Formula maintains, that the law must 1)U
recognized as the unchangeable will of God, valid alike for the regener-
ated as well as the unregenerated man. The distinction, rather than in
the lav;, is in man himself; the unregenerate doing the law of God out of
coercion and the regenerate with a willing spirit.
There are two concepts of the use of the law at work in the
Formula's treatment of the tertins usus legis . The first is the theologi"
cal use of the law (usus arguens) which continually calls attention to
the lack of perfection within which the believer yet remains and forces
reliance upon the gospel. The second use is the pedagogical use which
speaks to what the believer should do. Helmut Thielicke in his approach
to the problem points out that the Christian is, to be sure, free from
the dominion and curse of the lav; to the extent that he has wholly "crept
into Christ." Yet, the question arises as to whether or not that kin* '>
Christian exists in reality. ' He then introduces the concept of a
"quantatative" consideration of justification, of which he says "doen "•>"-
47
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the perfect tense of my having been justified ( justif icatum esse) imply
a being justified more and more (magis et magis justif icari) ? Quot-
ing Luther from the Third Disputation against the Antinomians, he argues
that it is only "to the extent that they are (in quantum sunt tales)
justified" that the law is not to be preached to the Christian. Follow-
ing the pedagogical understanding of the law put forward by Melanchthon
and accepted by the Formula , he defines the law as a "loving reminder,"
a "comfort in time of doubt (i.e., that I need to be summoned to seek,
51 52
not myself, but God), and a servant of love in the political realm."
Werner Elert would reduce the third use of the law completely to the
theological use.
The third use of the law does not differ from the first
and second in the kind of validity, it differs functionally with
reference to the area of validity. According to the usus spiritu -
al is the lav; applies to the just if icandi (those about to be
justified) and not to the justif icati (the just). It is not
intended for the new but the old creature. Because the new man
always lives in personal union (Personalunion) with the old man,
tne tertius usus implies validity of the law for the individual.






proprius or theolo,-;icu3. - J
This reduction by Elert of the tcrtius u su s let;is to the usus theolor'.icur.
would appear to destroy the basis for a principle or norm approach to law
Ibid., p. 127. 50 Ibid., p. 133-39.
51Ibid., pp. 139-';].. 32 Ibid., pp. 141-46.
-^L'erncr Elert The. Christ im E thos
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and to bring to the forefront once again the Reformation understanding
of the freedom of the Christian man. It suggests that the relationship
to the law, rather than the use of the law should receive primary
attention.
The Christian in his relationship to the law is not lawless, but
freely submits to the governance of the law inasmuch as it is an exempli-
fication of his relationship to God and expressive of his community with
the neighbor. Since the Christian yet remains in sin, that is, that
justification is not fully worked out in him, he still stands under the
judgment and thus cannot do the will of God. Insofar as he is found in
Christ his actions become transparent, possibilities for the sign of God
in his work of creating community and the humanization of man. "What
can and must be said is not what is good once and for all," Bonhoeffer
54
writes, "but the way in which Christ takes form among us here and now."
The Christian lives in the penultimate sphere in which he must make
decisions affecting himself and other people. For the sake of God, and
of the neighbor, those decisions must be made responsibly. The Christian,
therefore, utilizes that which is at hand to inform himself, not of the
most prudential course, but of the best course poss.ible under the given
circumstances. Having no absolute law or absolute good standing before
him, except, as Bonhoeffer expresses it, conformity with the Body of
54
Bonhoeffer, Ethics , p. 85.
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Christ, the Christian must act as Luther suggested in his letter to
Melanchthon concerning Melanchthon, a layman, preaching in the Church,
"pecca fortitier, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo. Even if a
Christian's actions must lead him into fields in which there are no clear
guiding lights, he is to sin boldly, but hope and rejoice even more boldly
in Christ. The Christian exercises faith in action. Faith itself "exists
only in the actuality of decision," as something which must constantly be
wrestled for at the edge of unbelief.
Over against this background, we can view the concept advanced by
H. Richard Niebuhr of man-the-responder first of all as raan-the-hearer.
Primary to the relationship is man's first hearing the pronouncement of
God's "Yes" in Christ in which the conversation between man and God reaches
its fulfillment. Better than the ruling concepts of man-the-maker (homo
faber) and man-the-citizen (homo politicus) , that of man-the-hearer/
responder best expresses the personal relationship in which man is held
by God. Niebuhr 's schema of 1) response, 2) interpretation, 3) accounta-
bility, and 4) solidarity provides a conceptual framework for describing-
the on-going relationship between the activity of God and the activity of
man in his world and with his neighbor.
Brunner, p. 80.
II. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible. Scl f , intro. James M.
Gustafson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 5(>-65.
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The Christian, being informed by a different context, exists in
a reciprocal relation to society. 'He is society's child in that he is of
his time and hears responsibly along with and on behalf of society for
the formation of community. As a hearer, however, he also stands over
against society, by his existence pronouncing judgment on both the goals
and means of the common life. In his own action, which itself stands
under judgment, he hopes for the impossible possibility of God's action,
a redeeming of" the time.
The concept of response-ibility seems to be in accord with the
concept of "obedience" as found in the Old and New Testaments. This con-
cept, as outlined by Gerhard Kittel, cannot be viewed in a vacuum apart
from the other words used to give expression to the dynamics of a life in
Christ. It is the outward manifestation of the "renewal of the mind""
that takes place when a person "puts on Christ." It is a presentation of
CO
the body "as a living sacrifice" which constitutes worship of God.
Most striking is the use of the word 0<fi>- K Q vJ ^'J in the New Testament to
represent the concept of obedience. For the Greek mystery religions, as
well as oriental gnosticism, sight was of paramount importance in man's
apprehension of God. In the Eleusian mysteries the climatic moment





59the witnessing of a divine manifestation. The emphasis of Old Testament
theology, and later, in the faith of Judaism which developed from it, is
entirely different. These religions are religions of the word which is
60
either heard or intended to be heard. Visual manifestations of the
divinity are unconrmon occurrences and tend to be underlined by the text
as events out of the ordinary. This is felt so strongly that when Moses
saw the "face of God" and talked with him "face to face" it was felt
necessary to tone down the statement to an indication that he saw cnly
the back of God " for man cannot see God and live. ' Seeing God is
treated by the Old Testament literature as an eschatological event which
takes place when Yahweh comes to Zion and men are no longer of unclean
64
lips. It is at that point that his glory will be seen.
For the Old Testament the decisive religious statement is "Hear
the Word of the Lord." This hearing is not simply an act of perception,
but rather, in Hebrew psychology is completed in action. The word engen-
ders response. The link between hearing and obedience is maintained not
only in Old Testament Hebrew, but also in Greek ( olKOQLvJ ^ Latin
59
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(preserving the root audire) , and also modern German (Gehorsam) . This
identity is an essential feature of biblical religion.
Within later Judaism there are two distinct lines of development.
In Apocalyptic literature primary emphasis is placed on contemplation of
eschatological symbols. While these are themselves bound up with words
which are to be heard and which help bring out their meaning, this assumes
a secondary role. In Rabbinic literature hearing is related to the Word
of God given in the sacred book. The strength of the underlying aware-
ness that all hearing is referred to God and His Will emerges most clearly
in the use of the schema, "Hear, Israel" as a daily confession.
Against this Old Testament background the use of d\<?Q ^_£-L—
and o( K°Q acquires its force. The New Testament revelation too is
a word to be heard. It is a message, a proclamation. Throughout the New
Testament "hearing" is emphasized, even more so in many cases thr.n seeing.
While the New Testament often reports events that were seen, these usually
acquire their true significance .in what is heard and become themselves
central to the message which is to be proclaimed. In the apostolic era
c(^ or) becomes a technical term for preaching without which faith
f\ 7
cannot exist. As is only natural, the content of hearing is determined
by the content of the proclamation. In the New Testament this is the
offering of salvation and the ethical demand, a blending of the indicative
G6Kittcl, I: 213. * Ibid., I: ?20.

and the imperative. There thus arises the crowning concept of obedience,
\jTfd l<on iTt or Ti '<*-> \ - . It is in keeping with the Old
Testament model that throughout the New Testament eschatology is described
in terms of seeing rather than hearing. The risen Lord is, for example
ii m69
seen.
Obedience ( U )to{t«>iJ>J ) in the New Testament first relates to
persons, such as children, slaves, or wives, who stand in a divinely
70
v?illcd relation of subordination. It can also be used to describe the
71 7?
relation of demons or nature to the omnipotence of Jesus and the
73
authoritative faith of the disciples. In the same sense, the terra can
be used to express the position of man in relation to dominant moral or
religious powers, whether in the good sense or in the bad. U'H £> k fV»
,
except in Philemon 21, is always used in connection with religious deci-
sion. When used alone the word also signifies the believing state of
Christians as this consists in obedience.
The New Testament sees as basic to a life of obedience the hearing
of the Word, The word which is to be heard, the ultimate word spoken by
68 69
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God, is Christ. The New Testament reveals an interesting development in
the presentation of the word that is to be proclaimed and heard. The
Baptism of Jesus concludes with the formulary "You are my beloved son
in whom I am wall pleased." At the Transfiguration this formulary is
expanded by the words "hear him" in the sense that this one who is pre-
sented is the one who is to be heard, the subject of hearing. By the
time of Peter s Pentecostal sermon it is precisely the crucifixion and
resurrection which are to be heard. It is then this proclamation of the
crucifixion and resurrection which becomes the constitutive element of
apostolic preachirvg.
In the process of his suffering and death, Christ Himself is
called upon to hear in the sense of an obedient response to his messianic
task. In a. passage dealing with the humiliation and_ exaltation of Christ
Paul can speak of Christ emptying Himself out, becoming obedient to death,
80
even the death of the cross. It is this hearing/response that here
underlies the concept of obedience. This thought is also reflected by
the author of Hebrews as he speaks of Christ learning obedience by the
81
things which He suffered.
76Mark 1:11 an d parallels.
78Acts 2:22-24.
80 Phil lip inns 2:8.






Faith is defined by the New Testament as a response to hearing
the word of God. It is intrinsically linked to obedience by Paul.
In the negative sense those who are without faith are those who have not
84
obeyed the Gospel. Obedience can thus be linked with salvation which
is worked out in fear and trembling through which God works to will and
to do his good pleasure. It is no longer an obedience to passions,
but to righteousness.
Having been set free for slavery to righteousness, obedience then
in contrast to the formal requirements of late Judaism can radicalize the
law. "You have heard that it was said to the men of old, 'You shall not
i „
87
kill . . . but I say to you that everyone who is angry. ... It
can be non-specific as to content as in the call of the disciples "Follow
„88
me and I will make you fishers of men or situational as in the parable
of the Good Samaritan. Ultimately, the hearing which results in doing can
89
be the separating factor between those who are and who are not redeemed.
The basic thought of the New Testament in its understanding of
hearing is that expressed by James, "But be doers of the IJord and not
hearers only, deceiving yourselves . . . being no hearer that forgets but
82















a doer that acts, he shall be blessed in his doing.
How, then, is war, and especially modern war with its innate
ability to precipitate a virtual Armageddon, to be viewed against this
perspective. Historically, the Church has normally adopted one of two
stances. It has either absolutized the sanctity of human life or it has
constructed for itself some form of the just war doctrine. The concept
of a just war was- not of major concern to the New Testament writers or to
the earliest Church fathers. The political situation of the early Church
gave it little opportunity to effect the disposition of governmental
affairs. Thus the New Testament presupposes warfare as a phenomenon of
91 92
this present age. In place of warfare it exalts peace. It was not
until the Church gained stature as a political entity that it became
necessary to deal specifically with the theological presuppositions of
93
warfare. The doctrine of the just war was formalized by Augustine and
94
refined by Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics. Basically, two questions
must be answered: What are the norms that govern recourse to the violence
of war and what are the norms that govern the measure of violence in \*ar?,
90 91
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The doctrine of just war assumes the raoral principle that "the
order of justice and law cannot be 'left without adequate means of its own
95defense." " At the same time it assumes a warping of the shape of life
in which love can at times only be practiced by involving one's self in
actual conflict with the forces which threaten one's neighbor. War-
fare must, in order to bemoral, have at its base a just cause. A just
cause is present when "under vital threat a state exhausts all peaceful
and diplomatic' means of avoiding war." The understanding of a neces-
sity for a "vital threat" to exist would preclude the legitimacy of
aggressive warfare in any form. The decision of the state to become,
involved in warfare must be openly arrived at and declared as the policy
of state. The declaration is to insure that the decision is conscientiously
arrived at and to submit this decision to the judgment of mankind. Inher-
ent to the doctrine of the just war is a concept of the limitation of
violence. The violence of warfare, and, therefore, the instruments used,
must be limited to the minimum necessary to insure the accomplishment of
the goal. The cost of warfare in terms of destruction must be ascertained;
for the theory requires that the evil involved in warfare not exceed the
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good expected to result. Finally, the state must weigh the possibility
of success.
The doctrine of just war is an appealing one and has been ably
98
argued by Paul Ramsey. The assumption of this doctrine moves the
Christian from a stance of absolute pacifism to that of applying a dis-
cerning conscience. Luther, though he accepted a doctrine of justifia-
ble warfare, calls the doctrine into question in a single sentence in his
brief essay !'«hether Soldiers, Too, Can Bs Saved." He writes, "I do not
99
trust, however, in the justice of ray cause, but in your grace and mercy.
If the justice of the cause cannot be argued, and if man stands under the
judgment of God, he cannot appeal to his own righteousness, then the con-
cept of a justifiable war is destroyed. Even self-defense, when viewed
from a Christian perspective, becomes a debatable issue. Must then the
Christian revert to a doctrine of absolute pacifism? The doctrine of
absolute pacifism, however, appears to be an argument from autonomy in
that it fails to recognize the neighbor's need. It is conceivable that
life in this present age can become warped to the extent that the demands
go
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of love do require engagement in conflict precisely for the sake of the
neighbor. Since wars arise from historical and economic considerations,
war for the Christian must be literally the ul t ima ratio, the final
appeal. For this reason, the option of pacifism must be maintained as a
check on the too easy appeal to trial by combat. War must, like all
human action, stand under the judgment of God; and there find the possi-
bility of becoming transparent to the activity of God. The aim of war can
only be the establishment, or reestablishment of community. Within this
framework the Christian must make decisions. As Reinhold Niebuhr argues
in An_ Interpretation of Christian Ethics
In the Christian interpretation of moral evil guilt is
attached not only to actions in which the individual is free to
choose a higher possibility and fails to do so, but in which
higher possibilities, which the individual is not free to choose,
reveal the imper feet ions of the action which he is forced to take.
Thus the simple moral guilt of conscious evil is transmuted into
a sense of religious guilt which feels a general responsibility
for that which the individual agent cannot be immediately responsi-
ble. While the ascription of guilt to actions which are derived
from the necessities of nature may lead to moral and religious
morbidity, it is true, nevertheless, that moral complacency toward
them is even more false to the human situation. Forces over which
we have no control may drive our nation into war. Shall we accept
f
all the moral alternatives which war makes inevitable as forced
upon us by an ineluctable fate?
Reinhold Niebuhr , An_ Interpretation o_f Christian Ethics (Hew
York: Harper & Brothers, 1931)), pp. 77-/o.

CHAPTER IV
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AS RELATIONSHIP
The military commander lives in a world of decision -which must
take into account the capabilities of the subordinate commanders and
personnel serving under him. It is a world which deals with the para-
meters of logistics, weapons selection, target determination, massing
of force, and all of the other components of decision-making in modern
warfare. These decisions are "real world," "real time" decisions
often made, of necessity, on the basis of incomplete and limited know-
ledge. To what extent can Christian ethics provide a context for and
illuminate these decisions of command? In discussing the concept of
"double effect" (i.e., any act may and often must accomplish two ends--
the good end intended and an evil end not willed but unavoidable in the
accomplishment of the good) within the framework of modern atomic -biolo-
gical -chemical warfare, Walter W. Slices raises the question of "how mAny
Russians is a decision-maker allowed to destroy in cold calculation but
'unintentionally' in order to prevent the Soviet occupation of West
Berlin?" This is a question, he says, which is proper and necessary to





the dec is ion -maker but totally outside the realm of Christian ethics.
Yet, if ethics cannot comment on such issues, which are of primary con-
cern in modern, discriminate warfare, it has failed utterly in its task
of providing meaningful discourse with the military commander. Here, Paul
Ramsey, at least, is honest in his evaluation of issues, and, though we
must disagree with some of his basic presuppositions, we must acknowledge
the forthrightness with which he has confronted the problems raised by
modern warfare.
Much has been written within the theological discipline concern-
ing warfare, but almost without exception theology has addressed itself
either to the question of war and the actions of nations (just war
theory, etc.)
,
or ha<s addressed itself to the place of the individual
(pacifism, selective conscientious objection). There has been little
serious theological reflection directed to the question of the military
commander and his position in the issue of war. In consideration of the
question of war or the question of the individual, he has primarily been
viewed as a functionary, from above as the instrument through which
policies of state are carried out or from below as the representative of
the policies of government.
In addressing himself to the Yaraashita case, General MacArthur
outlined the series of relationships in which a military commander exer-
cises his role. It will be the attempt of these few concluding pages to
raise the question of the theological issues, involved in the commander s
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confrontation with his troops, his country, his enemy, and mankind.
He failed his duty- to his troops ....
The commander and the personnel serving under him exist in a
symbiotic relationship. As noted in an article by Lieutenant Colonel
2
Philip M. Flamner, USAF, "" the individual soldier first existed in fealty
to an individual general or lord. At the time of the French Revolution
supreme alliegence was transferred from the general, admiral or head of
state to the state itself. It was not until the rise of the modern
... .nation-state that the state itself gained sufficient definition to serve
.as the object of such loyalty. VJith this shift of alliegence military
duty became a question of moral obligation. "This meant that everyone
from the lowest fighting man to the loftiest general now had a 'mission'
„3
which transcended their earlier relationships. In this manner the
modern concept of patriotism was born.
The difference between a military force and an armed cob is the
discipline inherent in the structure of the former. When the line troops
consisted of an assembly of riff-raff, it was necessary, as Friedrich II
ordered his generals, to insure that the troops on the firing line were
more afraid of the non-commissioned officers behind them than they were of
2
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the enemy to the front. For this reason also the former iron discipline
practised aboard naval vessels was necessary to keep the uncomprehending
seamen from reverting to an ineffective mob. That this situation has
changed with the advent of the technician-soldier is reflected in the
far-reaching changes which have been effected in the administration of
discipline within the armed forces. The changes, however, touch the
administration of discipline, and not the necessity for discipline itself.
- /sir-
With the assumption of a higher level of education and, hopefully, of
comprehension, it is the intention of most of the recent directions of
command thought to transfer, as much as possible,, the administration of
discipline to self -discipline.
The nature of the task of_ the commander is to command. It is his
responsibility both to be under authority and to represent authority. He
must be under authority in that his commands do not represent arbitrary
decisions on his part, but are contributive to the goals "which he has
been assigned to accomplish on behalf of the state. In his decisions he
stands not only before the judgment of his superiors, but, also, in the
exercise of his responsibility, before the judgment of God. At the same
time, as a representative of authority, it is his task to enforce his will
upon his subordinates. It is in the assumption that he is act in:; responsi-
bly that the obedience of subordinates is postulated. That this obedience
That this assumption is not, of necessity, valid has been recog-
nized in the Basic Army Field Manual: Rules of_ Ljmd_ Warfare, since 15
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is expected, and, under the Universal Code of Military Justice,
,
enforce-
able is a requirement of the very structure of a military force, and of
paramount concern to the commander.
A second factor is the virtual isolation of command. It is both
possible and expected that a platoon lieutenant will know each of the men
assigned to him, not only in terms of his military capabilities, but also
in terms of personal factors of family problems, disciplinary history, etc.
Where failings of junior officers have been noted in commands with which I
November 1944. The original passage had read "individuals of the armed
forces will not be punished for these offenses (acts which violate the
unchallenged rules of land warfare and outrage the general sentiments of
humanity) in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of
their government or commanders. The commanders ordering the commission
of such acts, or under whose authorities they are committed by the troops
may be punished by the belligerent into 'whose hands they may fall." This
was changed on the above date to read "individuals and organizations who
violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished therefor.
However, the fact that the acts complained of were done pursuant to order
of a superior or government sanction may be taken into consideration in
determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of
punishment. The person giving such orders may also be punished. ' The
as3uraptiQn_lyin_;jhehind this change is the right and duty of the individual
to disregard orders which are unlawful. It is interesting to note thafe
the German Field Manual, Mi l i taer s t ra fge
s
et r-.buch in Kriegsstrafrecht jord-
nung lists under "Militaerische Verbrechen und Vergehen" ' 1) If carryin.;
out an order in the course of duty should violate a law, only the sup
who gives the order is responsible. However, the subordinate who obeys it
is punishable as a participant: a. if lie goes beyond the given order or
b. when he knows that the superior's order would have the aim of lead
to a military or other crime or violation." See notes in Davidson, p.
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have been associated, it has not been primarily in the realm of their
technical and professional knowledge, but in the knowledge of the per-
sonnel under their control. This intimate knowledge of the personnel of
the command decreases in inverse ratio to the level of command. Both in
terms of the capabilities of his force and the reality of the command situ-
ation in which he is functioning, the senior corrmander is almost totally
dependent upon his personal staff and his subordinates. It is not possi-
ble for a division commander to have the same intimate knowledge of his
personnel that is expected of the platoon leader. For this reason the
senior commander must construct for himself a staff sensitive to and
capable of ascertaining the true state of affairs and of passing 3n hon-
est assessment of the situation to the commander for purposes of informa-
tion and decision. Since it is the commander himself who sets the tone
for his staff, his receptivity to adverse comment is a critical factor.
This relationship of subordinate and staff, so basic to the question of
knowledge, is an unexplored factor in the Yaraashita case. Granted ade-
quate time and power to effect change in his personal staff and subordln- '
ates, or if relief of the latter was impractical under the current Japanese
military regulations, to develop alternate channels .of information,
Yamashita could be held culpable for his lack of knovledgi- of l'.-.l- even!
transpiring within the area of his command.
Of the relationship between commander and subordinate, l
of Christian ethics inquires as to the possibility o: the fo
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community within the military unit. Each individual military or .-anir.acioa
has an existence as a community which extends beyond the Particular per-
sonnel attached to it at any given time. In Vietnam the Fourth >Lirine
Regiment carried in its symbols and its institutional memory a record of
its pre-World War II service in China. Within this on-goln^ community,
Christian ethics inquires as to the possibility of humanization. Modern
warfare is a dehumanizing experience. The constant association with death
and the withdrawal of normal external restraints of family, church, school,
community, etc., permit a brutalization and reversion to an almost animal
state. The events of My Lai as attested by the court martial of Lieutenant
V7illiam F. Calley are an example of the former. Two notes from ny ovn
experience serve to highlight the latter. In a search and destroy mission
in the mountains to the northwest of Hue, South Vietnam, our battalion
came across an area in which a preceeding unit had defecated over a vide
area in a clearing in the jungle and left the feces unburied where they
had fallen. It was a constant effort on the part of our o-.v-n battalion
commander to entice the personnel of the command to attend to their o-A\
personal hygiene. The often criticized order of General George Patton
that members of his command "dress like soldiers" was not given simply to
5See William Calley, Lieutenant Callev ; His Own Story: As V
To John Sack (New York: Viking Press, 1971) and Richard Hammer, TJ
Martial of LT Calley (New York: Coward, McGinn and Geoghegan, Inc., I
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enhance discipline, but to recall his people from the dehumanizing
effects of combat. It is in the preservation and effecting* of this
humanization both in combat and within the bureaucratic structure of the
modern military force that Christian ethics sees the role of the cemmande:
He failed his duty to his ... country.
. . .
In a letter to von Brauchitsch dated 16 July 1933, reflecting on
•
-/ti-
the dismissal of Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Werner von
Fritsch, on the basis of alleged homosexual offenses, and Minister of
War Werner von Blomberg, for dishonoring the officer corps by marrying
a woman with a police record, Generalo'oerst (Colonel General) Ludwig Beck
advanced the thesis that the supreme commander of military forces should
be appraised of all basic decisions concerning a war in being or in pros-
pect. If a refusal to obey is ethically indicated, such refusal must
begin here. It is this issue that underlay the dismissal of Fritsch and
Blomberg and the ultimate capitulation of the German officer corps to the
National Socialist Party. Beck goes on to say *
History will charge these leaders (the senior military conraandsrs)
with bloodguiltiness if they do not act according to their profes-
sional and political insight and judgment. Their soldierly obedi-
ence must end where their insight, judgment, and conscience forbid
the carrying out of a command. If their advice and warnings ai
not heeded, they have the right and the duty, before the nation and
before history, to resign their offices ... If they act in con-
cert with resolute will, the prosecution of the war is ::-.
... It betokens a lack of statura and of understanding o ...
tack if a soldier in high position in such tine
exclusively in terms of the limited sphere of his military task
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without any awareness of his supreme responsibility to the
nation as a whole. Extraordinary times demand extraordinary
acts.
Upon commissioning, the naval officer takes an oath to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith
and alliegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion and thai:
I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office
on which I am about to enter; so help me God.
The military ojfficer is an officer of the government, serving at the
pleasure of the President, charged with the carrying out of the policies
of the state. At the same time by virtue of his oath of office he is
called to an alliegence which reaches beyond all transcient policies. It
is this dual role that the discipline of ethics calls upon him to fulfill,
It is the latter role which is of utmost difficulty for the mili-
tary officer to fulfill. Basil H. Liddell Hart, a distinguished veteran
of World War I and a diligent student of military history has commented
Military criticism is the least popular of professions. The
critic has so much to gain by conforming to the prevailing
dogmas--if he but clothe the 'conventional tenets in fresh
verbiage, his wisdom will be applaudad--and so much to lose j.
if he emphasizes his inherent isolation by standing against
the current. Thus, subtract from the few the fearful and the
g
residue of true critics may well be zero. u
Quoted in Thiclicke, Pol itics
, pp. A 1 G - 1 7
.
"Appointment As Reserve Officer In United States Navy Bureau of
Naval Personnel Form 962, revised August 1959.
Flammer, p. 28. .>

so
That he spoke from experience is evidenced by the fact that his great
contributions to armored warfare were finally and reluctantly acknow-
ledged by his being knighted, appearing on the annual Queen's List pre-
ceded by the Beatles.
In his article on the Military Critic, Flaramer points out that
the "basic culture in which the gerta of unquestioning obedience can be
grown and nourished has continued to exist essentially undisturbed.'
."All that it needs to blossom," he goes on to say, "is one or more
of what we might gently call 'human weaknesses' . . . ." Among these
weaknesses, most critical in the present military organization, he lists
12 13
"concern for image," "unwillingness to admit error," and the "general
lack of moral courage.
In a time when the military services are experiencing a high level
of external criticism, it is a natural reaction to desire to close ranks
and meet the threat from without. Such external criticism is not entirely
unprecedented.
ibid. Ibid., p. 31.
n ibid. I2Ibid/
13 Ibid., pn. 31-32. ^Ibid., p. 32.
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For it's Tommy this, an 1 Tommy that, an' "Tommy, wait outside;"
But it's "Special train for Atkins" when the trooper's on the tide.
For it's Torrsny this, an' Tommy that, an "Chuck him out, the brute.'"
But it's "Savior of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot;
An it s Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' anything you please;
An 1 Tommy ain't a bloornin' fool --you bet that Tommy sees.
The external critic, while offering the possibility of a fresh point of
view, cannotj^in light of the high level of confidentiality demanded for
reasons of national security in modern warfare, replace the internal critic.
The responsibility of the military officer to advise the civilian leader-
ship of changes in the geo-political situation from a military point of
view is an on-going necessity and would allow for the reconsideration of
decisions previously taken in the light of changing circumstances. That
Yamashita, if we can accept the testimony of General Huto concerning
Yamashita's relationship with the To jo government as valid, did to some
extent exercise the role of critic would seem apparent.
He failed his duty ... to his enemy ... ^
Of primary consideration throughout the Scriptures is the position
of the neighbor. The relationship to the neighbor is seen as second only
"'Rudyard Kipling, "Tommy," Departmental Ditties mid P.;>rr.v'
Ball n or.; as quoted in George B. Woods, Hommer A. Watt, George K. Ander
and Karl J. Holzknecht, edsi The Li terature of Bn j m . vol. ?, 4th iJ.
(Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company), p. ;•,/.

9:
to the relaticmsri*:> to God. Consideration of this relationship occunics
a large portion of the Commandments, is the subject of parables of Jesus
and appears to be a determinate factor in the Last Judgment. The very
stress which Scripture places upon the neighbor would argue that the
natural" relationship is anything but the expression of love. Sartre,
writing in No Exit
, defines hell as "other people,' and in Be in.; and
Nothingness devotes a long section to the "other" who stands over against
17 - ^
us. It is the neighbor standing over against us as "enemy" that; reveals
to us our true relationship to the neighbor. "Unattractive, crochety,
impenitent, . . . the incarnation to us of the unteachableness of the
known man of the world who presents us with ever recurring new varieties
I Q
of provocation," the enemy stands over against us as a limiting factor.
In the enemy "all the surly misgivings and pessimistic judgments which
we harbour concerning our fellow man seem to be justified."" The enemy
is
not merely a rival or an unpleasant person, an opponent or an
oppressor, but the man who to my horror is engaged before my
very eyes in the performance of objective unrighteousness, the
nan through whom I am enabled to have actual experience of the
.20
known man of this world and to perceive him to be evil.
t
16Jcan-Paul Sartre, No Exit (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 47,
Sartre, Neiiy, and Nothingness , pp. 221-252.
Barth, Roman s , p. AG9. Ibid., p. 471.
20_, . . ,„1 1) id.
,




The enemy demonstrates specifically and finally the character of the
known man as evil, and, as a limiting factor of my existence we dis-
cover ourselves. As Pogo so whimsically put it, "we have met the enemy
and he is us." We are joined together in a peccatorum consiunio both
standing under the judgment of God and in this judgment presenting con-
joint opportunity for the- activity of God. Thus in the command to love
our enemy there is an over-reaching of the state of conflict which expresses
itself in the^admonition "if your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is
1 21
~
thirsty, give him drink' (render aid and comfort to the enemy, the
definition of— treason.'). Here hatred and blood lust have no part. The
community which is commanded is not the comradeship of brothers -in-arais
during a lull in battle or the chivalry of a pre-total war era, but a
true community based upon our common (fallen) humanity and the possibility
of reconciliation reaching beyond all conflicts of this present aeon.
From this it follows not only that our behavior is restricted
when by wounds or falling prisoner he has crept in among us and ceases to
be the enemy, but also while he yet remains our enemy. The practical
implications of this doctrine have only partially been explored in the
treatment of wounded and prisoners in the Geneva Conventions and the out-
lawry of weapons designed solely to increase pain (the so-called duia-dua




biological warfare elements). On the practical level it raises the Ques-
tion of the selection of weaponry (e.g., the use of tactical nuclear
weapons, napalm, etc.) from the level of tactical and strategic decision
to ethical decision. The ultimate goal of our relationship to our er.emy
is not his destruction, "but his conversion to neighbor.
If thy enemy hungers, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink; for




this final phrase as punishment, but might we not dare to be specula-
tive at this point and give it a metaphorical interpretation as the
"blush of shame"--for we have unenemied him.
He failed his duty ... to mankind.
It would be impossible to estimate the number of wars that have
been fought since the dawn of history. Ranging from tribal skirmishes to
total world involvement, they have been an almost constant companion o:'
man's experience of life. If Scripture is to be taken as a true witness,
wars and rumours of wars, in spite of man's best efforts to find othe$
means of solving his disputes, will continue to be a part of his experi-
ence until the end of the age. 'Jar is, for some inexplicable reason, an
integral part of this present neon, a visible sign of the demonic forc
with which man has infused the structure of his world. F.vcn in th
22
'Barth, Romans., pp. 474-75.
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of peace some thirty wars are raging or sputtering across the face of
the globe. Peace on earth yet -remains the angels' promise rather than
an actuality. It s definition has come to mean that one's own Armed
Forces momentarily are not engaged in actual conflict.
With this all-encompassing experience of war it would seem appro-
priate to ask what has warfare accomplished down through the ages of
recorded history. It has, most certainly, changed the alignment of
- su-
borders, destroyed empires, consumed the productivity of nations, destroyed
the epitome of young manhood, layed waste to vast areas, affected the
birthrate of nations, taught the experience of suffering to countless gen-
erations; all of these it has certainly accomplished. Even in tirr.es of
peace, the standing forces, necessary for protection and deterrence,
consume a significant portion of the wealth of the world without adding
a proportionate increase in productivity. The dollars and rubles spent
for the pleasure of staying alive feed no hungry, clothe no nakedness,
release no prisoner from captivity. Thus it must be asked again, what is
the goal of warfare? Hugo Grotius, writing in De Jure Belli ac Pads ,
23
styles the proper end of war as peace.
In the very heat of war the greatest security and expec-
tation of divine support must be in the unabated desire, and
invariable prospect of peace as the only end for which hostilities
2j
IIugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, trans. A. C. Cwpbell;
Intro. David J. Hill (Washington: M. Walter Dunne, Publisher, 1901), p. 17.
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can be lawfully begun. So that in the prosecution of war we
must never carry the rage of it so far, as to unlearn the
nature and dispositions of men. ... On whatever terms peace
is made, it must be absolutely kept.
Clausewitz defines war as "an act of violence intended to compel our
25
opponent to fulfill our will." "Uhence comes war?" Plato asks, "Wars
are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the
sake of and in the service of the body."
At its"very basis "war is a crystallization of the situation of
,27
the world in general." By its very existence it gives evidence of the
conflict inherent in the human situation. What then is the goal of war
and what does mankind attempt to achieve through war? The goal of war
2AIbid., pp. 417-18.
25Joseph I. Greene, ed., The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz
(Philadelphia: David McKay Company, The Living Thoughts Library, 1943),
p. 150. It is interesting to read Grotius, the father of International
Law, and Clausewitz, the father of strategy, side by side. The first
seeks to restrict the inherent evil of warfare, the latter strives to
explore how wars may be won. Shortly after the passage cited above,
Clausewitz, denigrating "the imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible
and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Lav;," goes on'
to say, "it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference
to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary
uses less vigor in its application. The former then dictates the law to
the latter, and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations
are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on either side."
This is the thought that gives one pause when considering the present
state of the art of war.
26
Plato, Phacdo , 66.
27




itself is an attempt to establish community. In all of the wars that
have been fought throughout the recorded history of mankind (even the
most imperialistic of wars) there has been an attempt to establish some
form of modus vivendi with our fellow man. The fragility of peace which
comes as a result of war is an attestation of the impossibility to estab-
lish true community by force of arms. "The very action which was intended
to overcome the disunion of man in good and evil," Bonhoeffer writes con-
corning the Pharisees, "does not achieve this aim but only aggravates the
no
disunion still further." Uar, as an attempt to establish community, is
an exercise of the demonic existence of man; for
The Bible does not wish man's own deed to be set side by sice
with the deed of God, even as a thankof fering or sacrifice, but
it sets man entirely within the actions of God and subordinates
human action to God s action.
Thus in the human state of war it always remains problematic whether or
not this state will become transparent to the activity of God._
The hisnanizaticn of one's people, the loyal service of the state
and" the criticism of its policies, the conversion of the enemy and the
establishment of community, these are the demands which the discipline of
Christian ethics raises for the one who would exercise command responsi-
bility.
/0Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 31.
29






In 1945, at the initiative of the United States, the General Assembly of
the United Nations affirmed unanimously "the principles of international
law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal." In 1950, the
International <&aw Commission formulated the Principles of Nuremberg, which
offer the most complete set of guidelines presently available on the rela-
tionship between personal responsibility and war crimes.
Principle I
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international
law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
Principle II
The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person
who committed the act from responsibility under international law.
Principle III
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law. *
Principle IV
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of h;Ls Government or of a
superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law,
provided a moral choice was in fact possible for him.
Principle V
Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to





The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international
law:
a. Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
b. War crimes: -
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited
to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labour or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns,
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
c. Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts
done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial
or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are
carried on in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or
any war crime.
Principle VII
Complicity in the commission of a crime against humanity as set forth in











United States Army Forces,
Western Pacific .
1 October 1945.




Pursuant to order of the Commission, the Prosecution respectfully
submits this, its Bill of Particulars, as follows:
Between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, at Manila and other
places in the Philippine Islands, members of Armed Forces of Japan under
the command of the Accused committed the following:
1. During the period from 9 October 1944 to 1 May 1945, under-
taking and putting into execution a deliberate plan and purpose to
massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian population of
Batangas Province, and to devastate and destroy public, private and
religious property therein, as a result of which more than 25,000 men,
women and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were brutally
mistreated andldlled, without cause or trial, and entire settlements
were devastated and destroyed wantonly and without military necessity.
2. During the period frcm 9 October 1944 to 2 February 1945,
at Santo Tomas Internment Camp at Manila, deliberate and wilfull failure
and refusal to provide food, medicine, clothing and other necessities to
the civilian internees there confined, with consequent starvation and
malnutrition, and deaths, of sucli internees; brutal mistreatment, beating
and torture of 11. F. Wilkins and other civilian internees; torture,
beating and summary execution of more than six (d) internees for minor
infractions of rules; cruel mistreatment , torture and brutal execution,




February 1945; of Carol C. Grinnell, Alfred F. Duggleby, Clifford Larson
and B. B. Johnson, all civilian internees.
3. During the months of October, November and December 1944,
brutally mistreating and torturing numerous unarmed noncombatant civilians
at the Japanese Military Police Headquarters located at Cortabitarte
and Mabini Streets, Manila.
4. On about 30 October 1944, at Corigara, Leyte, cruelly mis-
treating, torturing, mutilating and subsequently executing and, without
cause or trial, killing Private Wade E. Genseraer, a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States of America, then in captivity of the Armed
Forces of Japan as a prisoner of War.
5. During November 1944, in northern Cebu Province, massacre,
without cause or trial, or more than 1,000 unarmed noncombatant civilians.
6. During November and December 1944, at Cabanatuan, Nueva
Viacaya Province, brutal mistreatment, torture, maiming, execution and
killing, without cause or trial, of members of the Armed Forces of the
United States of America, then held captive as prisoners of war by
Armed Forces of Japan; wilfull failure and refusal to provide for such
prisoners of war adequate food", living quarters and facilities, clothing,
medical treatment or supplies, and other necessities; looting and steal-
ing the contents of, and wilfully failing to deliver or make available,
Red Cross packages and supplies intended for such prisoners of war.
7. On about 20 October 1944, at Batan Island, Batanes Province,
the brutal mistreatment, torture, execution and killing, without cause
or trial, of Captain William Burgh, Phillip Maurice Martin, and one
other person whose name is unknown, all members of the Armed Forces of
the United States of America and then in captivity of Armed Forces of
Japan as prisoners of war.
8. During the month of November, 1944, in the town of Lipa,
Batangas Province, brutally mistreating, torturing, and killing, without
cause or trial, eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces of the United
States of America, then held captive as prisoners of war by Armed Forces
of Japan. >
9. On about 14 December 1944, at or near Puerta Princesa,
Palawan Island, brutally mistreating, assasinating and killing, by
burning, bayonetting or shooting, without cause or trial, T/Sgt Jewett
F. Adams, Corporal Robert A. Adkins, 1st Lieutenant Carl C. Mango, and
138 other members of the Armed Forces of the United States of America,
then prisoners of war held in captivity by Armed Forces of Japan, and
brutally mistreating, wounding and attempting to kill, without cause or
trial, Corporal William J. Balchus, Pfc Ernest J. Koblos, and seven (7)
other members of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, all
then prisoners of war held in captivity by Armed Forces of Japan.
10. During the period from 18 December 1944 to 31 December 1944,
both dates inclusive, in Manila, brutally mistreating, torturing and
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killing, without cause or trial, Dr. Jose Enriquez, J. Allen Enriquez,
and Julia Seibert Enriquez, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
11. On about 29 December 1944, at the Barrio of Dapdap, Ponson
Island, Caraotes Islands, brutally mistreating and then killing, without
cause or trial, more than 300 unarmed noncombatant civilians, and
brutally mistreating, wounding, maiming and attempting to kill, without
cause or trial, more than 50 unarmed noncombatant civilians, being the
entire population of that Barrio.
12. During the period from 1 January 1945 to 17 February 1945,
both dates inclusive, fortification of an installation of military
objectives on the premises of the Philippine General Hospital, Ermita,
Manila, then in use as a civilian hospital, with consequent killing of
patients and civilian .refugees by shellfire.
13. dfi about 2S January 1945, at Los Banos Internment Camp,
laguna Province, brutally mistreating and than summarily executing, and,
without cause or trial, killing George James Louis, an unarmed noncom-
batant civilian subject of the United States of America, then interned
and held captive by Armed Forces of Japan.
14. On about 10 February 1945, at the Nurses 1 Home of the
Philippine General Hospital, Ermita, Manila, rape of civilian women.
15. During the period from 1 January 1945 to 1 March 1945,
both dates inclusive, deliberately, wantonly and without justification
or military necessity, devastating, destroying, and pillaging and loot-
ing of large areas of the city of Manila, including public, private and
religious buildings and other property, and committing widespread theft
of money, valuables, food and other private property in that city.
16. On about 4 February 1945, at the Dy-Pac Lumber Yard in
Manila, brutally mistreating and killing two unarmed noncombatant male
civilians.
17. During the period from 7 February 1945 to 14 February 1945,
both dates inclusive, at and in the vicinity of De La Salle College, 1501
Taft Avenue, Manila, brutally killing, without cause or trial, Judge
Jose R. Carlos and Brother Zavier, Rector of that College, both of whom
were unarmed noncombatant civilians; brutally killing, without causa or
trial, Antonio Carlos, Ricardo Bartolome, Dr. Antonio Cojuangco, and 38
other men, women and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, bru-
tally mistreating, wounding, maiming and attempting. to kill, without
cause or trial, Father Francis J. Cosgrave, Dionisia Carlos, Servillano
Awulno, and fourteen (14) other unarmed noncombatant civilians; rape of
two female civilians; attempted rape of one female civilian; and attempt
to have carnal intercourse with the body of one dead female civilian.
18. On about 7 February 1945, at Malate, Manila, killing, with-
out cause or trial, Arsenic Kscudero, Jr., and Jose Herman, Jr., and bru-
tally mistreating and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Jose
Herman, Sr., all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
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19. During the period from about 6 February 1945 to about 8
February 1945, both dates inclusive, at and in the vicinity of the
National Psychopathic Hospital,. Mandaluyong, Rizal Province, brutally
mistreating and then killing, without cause or trial, Tomas Aguinaldo,
Tomas Corpus, Father Lafarrier, Isidro Lagucillos, and 17 other persons,
all unarmed noncombatant civilians; and the rape and subsequent brutal
killing, without cause or trial, of one (1) civilian female doctor.
20. On about 10 February 1945, at Malate, Manila, killing,
without cause or trial, Angel Gajo; and brutally mistreating, wounding
and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Eutiquio Antipolo, Dimes
Antipolo and Feliciano Lamactud, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
21. On about 11 February 1945, at Pasay, Rizal Province, bru-
tally mistreating and thereafter killing, without cause or trial, Henry
Daland and Tony Daland, citizens of the United States of America,
Caterino Alayso and Romula Daro, Filipinos, and Jacinto da la Vera and
Gregorio Mondoz, citizens of Spain, all unarmed noncombantant civilians;
and wantonly and deliberately and without military necessity burning and
destroying private property, the houses and homes of civilians.
22. On about 11 February 1945, near Singalong Church, Manila,
brutally killing, without cause or trial, Lazar Braun, an Austrian
citizen, Robert Markus, A German citizen, and Alexander Farmakowski,
a Russian, all unarmed and noncombatant civilians.
23. On about 7 February 1945, near Singalong, Manila, brutally
mistreating and torturing and thereafter executing and killing, without
cause or trial, Lt. Col. Alejo Valdes and Lt. Col. Jose Guido, disarmed
and demobilized formar members of the Philippine Army, and Raymond Valdes,
Ernesto Mirillo, Justo Guido, Jose Guido, Jr., Raymond Guido, and thir-
teen (13) other persons whose names are unknown, all unarmed and noncom-
batant civilians.
24. On about 7 February 1945, at Paco, Manila, brutally mis-
treating and thereafter killing, without cause or trial, Bartolcno Pons,
Rosario Garcia Pons, Eva V. Ponsi Edward King, Pacita King, Dolfin Marquez,
and two (2) other persons whose names are unknown, all unarmed and noncom-
batant civilians.
25. During the period from 1 January 1945 to 1 March 1945, delib-
erately planning and undertaking, without cause or trial, the extermina-
tion, massacre and wanton, indescriminate killing of large numbers of
unarmed noncombatant civilian men, women and children, inhabitants of the
City of Manila and its environs, brutally mistreating, wounding, mutila-
ting, killing and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, large num-
bers of such inhabitants, and raping or attempting to rape large numbers
ot civilian wom^n and female children in that city.
26. Cn about 12 February 19A5, at 914 Indiana Street, Malate,
'Manila, brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial. Alexan
Bachrach, Antonio Irlanda, Vonancio Quinto.ro, Eduardo de Ion Reyes, Jose
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Vallo, and five other persons whose names are unknown, all unarmed non-
combatant civilians.
27. On about 9 and 10 -February 1945, in and in the vicinity of
the San Morcelino Church and the Saint Vincent de Paul House, Ermita,
Manila, brutally mistreating and killing without cause or trial, Father
Jose Aguirroche, Father Luis Egoda, Father Jose Fernandoz, Father Julio
Ruiz, Father Adolfo Soto, Father Jose Tojada, all Spanish Vincontian
Catholic priests, and 21 other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians;
and brutally mistreating, wounding and maiming and attempting to kill,
without cause or trial, Co Ching, an unarmed noncombatant Chinese civilian.
28. On about 10 February 1945, at the corner of Taft Avenue and
Padro Faura Street, Ermita, Manila, killing, without cause or trial,
Supreme Court Jus'tice Anacleto Diaz and his two sons, Folino Angelos, Jose
Angelos, Romaff'Ardona, and 33 other persons, and wounding and attempting
to kill Juanito De Los Reyes, Dolfin Da Los Paz, Antonio De Mayo, and
six (6) other persons and attacking and attempting to kill, Paul J. Akot,
Ah Soo Chua, and 11 other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, and
all without cause or trial.
29. On about 10 February 1945, at Paco, Manila, massacreing
and killing 12 unarmed noncombatant civilians and wounding, maiming and
attempting to kill 3 unarmed noncombatant civilians, all without cause
or trial, and unnecessarily and wantonly burning and destroying private
property, the houses and homes of civilians.
30. On about 10 February 1945, at and in the vicinity of the
Philippine Red Cross Building, Isaac Peral and General Luna Street,
Manila, massacring and killing, without cause or trial, more than 53 men.
women and children, and wounding, maiming and attempting to kill four
persons, all unarmed and noncombatant civilians; and unnacessax'ily ^and
wantonly burning and destroying the said building and its furniture,
fixtures and contents.
31. On about 7 February 1945 at and in the vicinity of 1462 Taft
Avenue in Pasay, Rizal Province,' cruelly and brutally mistreating and
thereafter massacring and killing more than 100 Filipino and French c'ivilians
without cause or trial, all being unarmed noncombatant civilians; wounding,
maiming and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, seventeen unarmed
noncombatant Filipino civilians; raping and thereafter killing unarmed
noncombantant civilian women; unnecessarily and wantonly burning and
destroying private property of civilians, the house and home of Mrs. Dona
Conception Soblador Campos; and seizing, confiscating and stealing money,
jewels, watches and other private property of civilians.
32. On about 9 February 1945, at and in the: vicinity of St. Paul's
College, Malate, Manila, cruelly and brutally mistreating Marcel ino Punssalon,
Mane.loo Carlos, Sr., Estclita Bonito, and approximately 600 other person ,
"including men, women and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; bru-
tally massacring and killing without cause or trial, Bruno Acuna, Cclia
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Aguas, Jose Aquino, and 370 additional persons, including nen, wonen and
children, all unarmed noncorabatant civilians; wounding, maiming and
attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Colostina Antipolo, Zeila
Antipolo, Cornelia Ayson, and 24 other persons including men, women and
children, all unarmed noncorabatant civilians; unnecessarily, deliberate-
ly and wantonly burning and destroying buildings, together with fixtures,
furniture and other contents thereof, and dedicated to religion, art and
science and not used for military purposes, of the aforesaid St. Paul's
College; and seizing, confiscating and stealing money, jewels and other
private property of civilians.
33. On about 9 February 1945, in the vicinity of Dana Perfume
Factory, Pasay,- Rizal Province, cruelly beating, torturing and there-
after killing, without cause or trial, Eugene Andrewitz Kremloff,
Russian, Julian Jawaia and Alfredo Gana, Filipino, all unarmed noncora-
batant civilians.
34. During the period from 9 February 1945 to 17 February 1945,
both dates inclusive, at and in the vicinity of Bay View Hotel, Alharabra
Apartment Hotel, Miramor Apartment Hotel and Manila Hotel, all in Ermita,
Manila, cruelly mistreating and abusing approximately 400 women, all
unarmed and noncombatant civilians; cruelly mistreating, abusing and
repeatedly raping more than 40 women and female children, and cruelly
mistreating, abusing and attempting to rape more than 36 other women and
female children; unnecessarily and wantonly burning, damaging or destroy-
ing the said buildings, private property, their furniture, fixtures and
contents.
35. On about 8 and 9 February 1945, in Malate, Manila, killing,
without cause or trial, Africa Canillas, Amparo Canillas, Charles Canillas,
Elvira Canillas, and five (5) other members of the Felipe Canillas family,
and Zoillo Llave, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; pillaging and
unnecessarily and wantonly burning and destroying private property, the
house and home of Felipe Canillas.
36. On about 13 February 1945, in the vicinity of No. 1609^1'aft
Avenue, Malate, Manila, cruelly mistreating and subsequently killing,
without cause or trial, Albert P. Delfino, Venezuelan Consul in Manila,
then known by the perpetrators to be such, Francis A. Delfino, Maria
Dolores Delfino, and John Doo Ching, all unarmed noncorabacant civilians;
cruelly mistreating, wounding, and attempting to kill, without cause or
trial, Igmidio Ramos, and a woman whose name is unknown ; unnecessarily
and wantonly burning and destroying private property, including the house
at 1609 Taft Avenue and numerous other buildings in that area, together
with the furniture, fixtures and contents thereof.
37. On about 11 February 1965, at 15S0 Taft Avenue, Malate,
Manila, killing, without cause or trial, Vassanoal Popardes and three (3)
other British Indians, and Emilio Tubayano and three (3) other Filipi os,
all unarmed noncombatants; unnecessarily and wantonly burning and destroy in
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private property, the house and home of Hashmatrai Hatchand, together
with the furniture, fixtures and contents thereof.
38. On about 7 February 1945, near the Syquia Apartments in
Malate, Manila, killing, without cause or trials, Father Peter Fallon,
Father John Honaghan, Father Patrick Kelly and Father Joseph Honaghan;
Priests of the Malate Catholic Church and Convent, and Jose ChicQ,
Gerardo Rictra, Jack Sullivan, Conrado Vallenas, Victor Velasco, Bertito
Zaraora, Marcial Zamora, and Cristi Malaban, all unarmed noncoabatant
civilians.
39. On about 9 February 1945, at 515 Dakota Street, Malate,
Manila, killing, without causa or trial, Kishinchand Mirahandani, Devji
al Changomal Lalivani, Thelma Parrish and Carl Parrish, Jr. (infant child),
all unarmed nonccinbatant civilians.
40. ©h about 20 February 1945, in the Iloguin District approxi-
mately 2% kilometers ea3t of Pasig, Rizal Province, brutally mistreating
and robbing, and subsequent killing, without cause or trial, of Candido
Jabson, and the brutal mistreatment, robbery, wounding and attempt to
kill of Raymunda Jabson and Dofina Jabson, all unarmed noncombatant
civilians; attempt to rape Raymunda Jabson; robbery, seizing, confisca-
ting and stealing watches, clothes and other private personal property;
and pillage of private property. .""..'.'
41. On about 12 February 1945 at 150 Vito Cruz Street, Singalong,
Manila, brutal mistreatment, torture, burning alive or otherwise killing
Carlos Perez Rubio, Sr., Lopita Perez Rubio, Javier Perez Rubio, Herbert
Fox, Mrs. Herbert Fox, Marina Padua, Alphonso Pahodpod, and more than
twenty-two other persons including men, women and children, and brutally
mistreating, attempting to burn alive and wounding Jose 3alboa, Ignacio
Bustamante and other persons; all unarmed and noncombatant civilians;
unnecessarily, deliberately and wantonly burning and destroying private
property, the house and home of Carlos Perez Rubio, Sr.
42. On about 28 February 1945, at the Town of Bauan, 3atangas
Province, brutally mistreating and subsequently massacring and killing
without cause or trial, Enrique Martinez, Maximino Brual, and more thhn
400 other persons, including men, women and children, all unarmed noncom-
batant civilians; brutally mistreating, wounding and attempting to kill,
Dr. Francisco Manigbas, Gemeniano M. Brual, and ir.ore than 100 other per-
sons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; and pillaging, unnecessarily
and wantonly devastating and destroying public, religious and private
prop arty.
43. During the period from 16 February 194 5 to 18 February 1 9-M.
,
both dates inclusive, at the Town of Taal, Batangas Province, brutally
mistreating, massacring and killing, without- cause or trial, , nin
Morono, an infant 1 year of age, Andres Brionos, Alberto Martol, Pablo
-Marasigon, Dalraacio Luna, Concordia Barrion, Alicia Barrion, together with





civilians; in the Barrios of San Nicolas and Sinturisan, pillaging and
unnecessarily, deliberately and wantonly devastating, burning and destroy-
ing all houses and other buildings.
44. On about 19 February 1945, in the Town of Cuenca, Batangas
Province, brutally mistreating, massacring and killing Jose M. Lague,
Esteban Magsomdol, Jose Lunbo, Felisa Apuntar, Elfidio Lunar, Victoriona
Romo, and 978 other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; pillag-
ing and unnecessarily, deliberately and wantonly devastating, burning
and destroying large areas of that town.
45. On about 20 February' 1945, at the Town of San Jose, Batangas
Province, brutally mistreating, massacring and killing, without cause or
trial, Vinancia Romo, Vincente Frank, Jose Talog, Roman Umali, and more
than 500 other persona, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; pillaging and
unnecessarily, deliberately and wantonly devastating, burning and destroy-
ing large areas of that town.
46. On about 19 February 1945, at the Town of Mataasnakahoy,
Batangas Frovince, brutally mistreating, massacring and killing approxi-
mately 200 men, women and children, the names of whom are not yet deter-
mined, all being unarmed noncombatant civilians; pillaging and unneces-
sarily, deliberately and wantonly devastating, burning and destroying
large areas of that town.
47. During the period from 16 February 1945 to 19 March 1945,
both dates inclusive, at the Town of Santo Tomas, Batangas Province, bru-
tally mistreating, massacring and killing Paz Austria, Adeleida Castro,
Caladia Cabrera, Rodolfo Talad, and more than .1500 other men, women and
.children, all unarmed and noncombatant civilians; pillaging and unneces-
sarily, deliberately and wantonly burning, damaging and destroying all
public buildings and private homes.
43. On about 10 February 1945, in the Paco District of Manila,
brutally mistreating, torturing, mutilating and killing, without cause or
trial, Regina Alcid, Bonifacio Bogamesbod, Ricardo Baja, Eugeni Balleta,
and more than 300 other persons ;• brutally mistreating, torturing, mutilat-
ing, wounding and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Vicente
Alcid, Eustaquio Batoctoy, Eugene Boyot and more than 100 other persons;
all unarmed noncombatant civilians; deliberately and wantonly burning and
destroying, without military necessity, private property, a house at
1195 Singalong Street, Manila.
49. During the period from 16 February 1945 to 19 March 1945,
both dates inclusive, in the Town of Lipa, Batangas Province, brutally
mistreating, wounding and killing, without cause or trial, Ricardo Caringal,
Francisco La Torre, Pedro La Torre, Sovero Lubrica, Santiago Lima tok, and
more thau 12,000 other men, women and children, all unarmed noncombatant
civilians; and pillaging, deliberately, and wantonly and without mi]
necessity devastating, burning, damaging and destroying public and prl





50. On about 8 February 1945, at Santa Rosa College, Intramuros,
Manila, the abduction and subsequent brutal mistreatment and killing of
Aida Aplin, Leo Gump, Kenneth Huebch, Edgar Christianson, Father Cornelius
Van Russell, William Mitchell, Valoriano Cueva, and other persons, all
unarmed noncombatant civilians.
51. On about 10 February 1945, at or near the Santa Rosa College,
and at Manila Armory, Manila, the abduction and subsequent brutal mis-
treatment and killing, without cause or trial, of Bartoloae Pinilio,
Evencio Piquoro, Adriano Ramos, Leon Ulit, Anastacio Montano, Juanito
Tabal, Arraanda Ebanez, and 54 other men, women and children, all unarmed
noncombatant civilians; brutal mistreatment, wounding and attempt to kill,
without cause or trial, of Conrado Tauro, Mama Moro, and Wong Ling, all
unarmed noncombatant civilians.
52. During tha period from 10 February 1945 to 23 February 1945,
at Fort Santiago, Intramuros, Manila, brutal mistreatment, starvation,
torture, wounding, maiming, burning alive, massacre and killing, without
cause or trial, of more than 4,000 unarmed noncombatant civilians.
53. On about 17 February 1945, at Santo Domingo Church, Intramuros,
Manila, brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial, Dr.
Cecilio Noriega, Dr. Manuel Lahoz, Conrado Pili, Lazero Cordero, Dado
Pili, and other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
54. On about 10 February 1945, in the town of Tanauan, Batangas
Province, brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial, 500
unarmed noncombatant civilians, and deliberately and wantonly and without
military necessity devastating and destroying public and private property.
55. On about 12 February 1945, at Calamba, Laguna Province,
massacre, without cause or trial, of more than 7,000 unarmed noncombatant
civilians, and rape of 37 civilian women.
56. -On about 9 April 1945, at the Town of Pingus, Laguna Province,
massacre, without cause or trial, of 41 unarmed noncombatant civilians.
57. On about 13 March 1945, at the Town of Rosario, Batangas
Province, massacre and killing, without cause or trial, of Lorenzo
Masilungan, Sakeo Tolentino, Marcela Tolentina, Ilias Garcia, SaturnLna
Barcelos, and more than 45 other persons, including men, women and child-
ren, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; and pillaging and unnecessarily
and wantonly devastating and destroying public, religious and private
property.
53. On about 6 March 1945, at Los Banos, Laguna Province, massacr-
ing and killing, without cause or trial. Any; Kai, and 26 other Chinese,
nnd brutally mistreating, wounding, maiming and attempting to kill, with-
out cause or trial, Elisa Ang and Kim Ling Ang, unarmed and noncombatant
civilians; and brutally mistreating and attempting to kill, without cause




59. On about 12 February 1945, at Pax Court, Pasay, Rizal
Province, brutally mistreating, torturing and killing, without cause or
trial, Antonio Villa-Real, a retired Justice of the Philippine Supreme
Court, Melchora Oulima, Maria Peronilla, and twelve (12) other persons,
and brutally mistreating, torturing, wounding and attempting to kill,
without cause or trial, Dr. Walter K. Frankel, Hans Albrecht, Luhrse,
Alice Stahl, and other persons, and deliberately, wantonly and without
military necessity burning and destroying private property, the house
at 168-B Balagtas Street, Manila,' and the furniture, fixtures and con-
tents thereof.
60. On about the night of 19-20 February 1945, at and in air
raid shelters near Plaza McKinley, Intramuros, Manila, brutally mis-
treating and killing, without cause or trial, Gaudencio Castrillo, Victor
Gonzales, Benigno Cano, and more than 100 other Catholic priests, citizens
of Spain, and other persons, and brutally mistreating, wounding and
attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Laurentino De Pablo, Jose
Manajabacas, Jose M. Barrulo, Father Belaraino de Cells,' Julio Rocamura,
and other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
61. During the period^from 6 February 1945 to 22 February 1945,
both dates inclusive, brutally mistreating, and imprisoning in St.
Augustine Church, Intrarauros, Manila, without food, medical supplies or i>
other necessities, and unnecessarily and deliberately exposing to shell
fire in an in the vicinity of that Church, approximately 6,000 men,
women and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, by reason whereof
a large number of such civilians died of starvation, disease and mis-
treatment. —
62. During the period from 6 February 1945 to 22 February 1945,
both dates inclusive, at the St. Augustine Church in Intrarauros, Manila,
brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial, Sister Felisa
Anza and more than 50 other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
63. On about 23 February 1945, in the vicinity of St. Augustine
Church, Intramuros, Manila, killing, without cause or trial, Dr. Seguenza
and other persons, and wounding and attempting to kill, without cause or
trial, Ester Aenello, and other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
64. During the period from 6 February 1945 to 23 February 1945,
both dates inclusive, in and in the vicinity of St. Augustine Church and
Convent, Intrarauros, Manila, brutally abusing, raping and attempting to
rape numerous women and female children; wounding, killing end attempt:
to kill, without cause or trial, unarmed noncombatant civilians; pilfer-
ing, stealing and looting personal property of civilians confined therein,
including watches, money, clothing, food, medical supplies, jewelry, and
other personal belongings; installing, maintaining, and operating, in and
on the premises of the Church and Convent, military weapons and otl
military objectives, despite the exclusively religious purpose and non-
military use of those buildin.;.-; ; and d ' retely and wantonly, without
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military necessity, devastating, burning and destroying the Convent and
damaging the Church, together with the furniture, fixtures, religious
library and other properties therein.
8 October 1945
Respectfully submitted,





/S/ Robert H. Kerr
Major, Infantry

SUPPLEMENTAL BILL OF PARTICULARS
The Prosecution respectfully submits this, its Supplemental Bill
of Particulars, as follows: In addition to the acts specified in the Bill
of Particulars heretofore filed, 'members of the armed forces of Japan,
under the command of the Accused, were permitted to commit the following
during the period from 9 October 1944 to 2 September 1945 at Manila and
other places in the Philippine Islands:
65. During the oerlod from 9 October 1944 to about 31 October
1944, at the Towns of Medillan and Daanba»it3yan, Cebu Province, brutal
mistreatment and massacre of men, women and children, all unarmed non-
combatant civilians; raping of women; looting and piHage; devastation
and burning, without military justification, of houses and other property.
66. During the period from 9 October 1944 to about 1 February
1945, at Cavite City, Imus, and elsewhere in Cavite Province, brutally
mistreating, torturing, and killing or attempting to kill, without cause
or trial, unarmed noncombatant civilians.
67. During the period from 9 October 1944 to about 5 February
1945, at and in the vicinity of Davao Penal Colony, City of Davao,
Mindanao Island, brutal mistreatment, torture, starvation, killing, and
attempting to kill_, large numbers of persons then and there held as
prisoners of war or as civilian internees; willful failure and refusal,
without justification, to provide for such prisoners of war and internees
proper and adequate shelter, food, water, clothing, sanitation, medical
care, and other essentials; abandoning, and leaving without any care or
attention whatever, helplessly sick, wounded or starved prisoners of war
and internees; and deliberately profaning the bodies of dead prisoners of
war and internees. >,
68. During the period from 9 October 1944 to about 10 February
1945, at and in the vicinity of Fort Santiago, Intramuros, Manila, brutal
mistreatment, starvation, torture, wounding, poisoning, burning alive, and
killing, without cause or trial, of numerous unarmed noncombatant civilians.
69. During the period from 9 October 1944 to about 23 February
1945, failure and refusal without justification to provide for 0.scar P.
RHUDID and othar American noncombatant civilians then detained and
interned at Los Banos Prison Camp, Laguna Province, adequate or |>r>>p.-r
quartcrs, bedding, food, clothing, sanitation facilities, medical care, and
other esssntial facilities and supplies.
70. During the period from 9 October 1944 to about 1 M.»y 1945,




wounding, and killing, without cause or trial, large numbers of unarmed
noncorabatant civilians; raping civilian women; looting and pillaging;
wantonly and without military justification devastating, burning and
destroying private and public property, including property devoted
exclusively to religious, hospital, or educational purposes.
71. During the period from 9 October 1944 to about 31 August
1945, at and in the vicinity of Manila and other places, compelling non-
combatant civilians to construct fortifications and entrenchments and
otherwise take part in the operations of armed forces of Japan against
the country of those civilians.
72. During the period frcn 9 October 1944 to about 1 September
1945, in the Philippine Islands generally, deliberately undertaking to
terrorize, brutalize, massacre and exterminate noncombatant civilian men,
women, and ch.iJ.dren, and to pillage, loot, devastate, burn and otherwise
destroy towns, cities and other settlements, and public and private
property, including property used exclusively for religious, educational,
hospital, scientific and charitable purposes.
73. During the period from about 21 October 1944 to about 13
December 1944, at Old Bilibid Prison, Manila, brutal mistreatment and
deliberate neglect of, and failure and refusal, without justification, to
provide proper and adequate quarters, food, water, clothing, sanitation
facilities, medical care, and other essential facilities and supplies, to
Colonel William D. NORTH, Colonel Jack VJ. SCHWARTZ, Lt. Colonel Roy L.
BODINE, JR., Major Robert E. CONN, and more than 2,200 other persons, all
then and there held as prisoners of war; on about 13 December 1944, at
Manila, deliberately subjecting 1,600 of said prisoners of war to public
humiliation.
74. On about 22 October 1944, at Manila, summary execution, with-
out cause or trial, of three (3) members of armed forces of the United
States of America then held as prisoners of war.
75. On about 24 October 1944, near the Town of Concepcion, Tarlac
Province, brutal mistreatment, torture, and subjecting to public humilia-
tion, of an American prisoner of war, name unknown. >,
76. During the period from about 31 October 1944 to about 15
January 1945, at Sakura Prisoner of War Camp, Ft. McKinley, near Manila,
grossly improper imprisonment of Thomas Eugene ILARRELL, a member of armed
forces of the United States of America then held as a prisoner of war,
together -with 400 other such prisoners of war; and 'failing and refusing,
without justification, to provide such prisoners of war with adequate or
proner quarters, shelter, bedding, food, water, sanitation, clothing,
medical care, and other essential facilities and supplies.
77. During the month of October or November 1944, exact date
unknown, brutally mistreating and executing, without cause or trial, .it
,North Cemetery, Manila, Mabel JURIKA, citizen of the United States of




78. On about 5 November 1944, at Imus, Cavite Province, brutally
mistreating and killing, without cause or trial, Elpidio ESTERIS and
other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
79. On about 12 November 1944, at the Town of Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya Province, brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or
trial, Leon Mina PASCUA, Alejandro GR0S3E, Quidit Victorio QUINES, Juan
GARCIA, and other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
80. During the month of November 1944, exact date unknown, at
North Cemetery, Manila, brutally mistreating and killing, without cause
or trial, 26 unarmed noncombatant civilians, names unknown.
81. On about 1 December 1944, at Calapan, MIndoro Province,
brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial, unarmed noncom-
batant civilians; confiscating and stealing food and other supplies
essential for-&Sthe survival of civilians; deliberately and wantonly, with-
out military justification, devastating and burning houses and other
property.
82. On about 10 and 11 December 1944, at the Village of Polo
and the Town of Obando, Bulacan Province, brutal mistreatment and massacre,
without cause or trial, of 400 unarmed noncombatant civilians.
83. During the period from about 15 December 1944 to about 24
December 1944, in the vicinity of Olongapo, Zambales Frovince, and dur-
ing the period from about 24 December 1944 to about 27 December 1944, en
route therefrom to Manila, brutal mistreatment, neglect, and deliberate
failure and refusal, without justification, to provide proper quarters,
transportation, food, water, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and
•other essential facilities and supplies, to Colonel William D. NORTH,
Colonel Jack W. SCHWARTZ, Lt. Colonel Roy L. 3CDINS, JR., Major Robert E.
CONN, and more than 1,600 other persons, all members of armed forces of
the United States of America then and there held as prisoners of war by
armed forces of Japan; deliberately and unnecessarily exposing said prison-
ers of war to gunfire and other hazards; and on about 27 December 1944,
at Manila, deliberately subjecting said prisoners of war to public humili-
ation. *'
84. On about 16 December 1944, at Dasmarinas, Cavite Province,
brutally mistreating and killing, or wounding and attempting to kill,
without cause or trial, Reynaldo BUENAVENTURA, Jose RAMIREZ, JR., and
other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
85. On about 16 December 1944, at Imus , Cavite Province, brutally
mistreating and imprisoning, without cause or trial, Dr. Andres DOMINGUEZ,
Dr. Lazaro ILANO, Dr. Jose SAPINOSO, Dr. Modesto MASCARDO, Dominador
CAMSRINO, and all the other male inhabitants of Imus; thereafter abduct-
ing said physicians and imprisoning them at Military Police Headquarters at
Cortabitarte and Mabini Street?., Manila, and subsequently kill in., them,
all without cause or trial.

86. On about 28 and 29 December 1944, en route from Carap Holmes
Internment Camp near Baguio, Mountain Province, to Old Bilibid Prison
Camp, Manila, brutal mistreatment of, and failure and refusal, without
justification, to provide food 'and water for, Janes Douglas TYSON, his
wife and son, Mrs. Edna May BARZ, her husband and son, and other ^en,
women and children, all noncombatant American civilians then detained and
interned by armed forces of Japan.
87. During the period from 29 December 1944 to 4 February 1945,
at Old Bilibid Prison Camp, Manila, detention and internment of Mrs. Edna
May BARZ, Carl ESCH3ACK, and more' than 475 other American noncombatant
civilian men, women and children, without adequate or proper quarters, or
shelter, bedding, food, water, sanitary facilites, clothing, medical care,
and other essential facilities and supplies, and deliberate failure and
refusal, without justification, to provide such facilities and supplies.
33. Druing the month of December 1944, at .North Cemetery,
Manila, brutally mi3tre3ting and killing, without cause or trial, Herario
CRUZ, Lauro CERIO, Francisco HERNANDEZ, Pedro REYES, Cristobal GOMEZ,
Santiago RAMOS, Godofredo LUNA, Gonzalo CRUZ, Gomel MANTEL, Eduardo
AVILIDO, Ernesto PEREZ, Pulaviano ALCANTARA, Joestada MENDOZA, and more
than 2,000 other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
89. During the month of December 1944, at Manila, with respect
to Macknal HOOVER, Henry Guy LIND03L00M, Estorito ARGUINO, and other
prisoners of war, subjecting to trial without prior notice to a representa-
tive of the protecting power, without opportunity to defend, and without
counsel; denying opportunity to appeal from the sentence rendered; failing
to notify the protecting power of the sentence pronounced; and executing
a death sentence without communicating to the representative of the pro-
tecting power the nature and circumstances of the offense charged.
90. On about 19 January 1945, at the Towns of San Fernando and
San Juan, La Union Province, brutal mistreatment and massacre, without
cause or trial, of unarmed noncombatant civilians, and rape of civilian
women.
91. During the period from about 25 January 1945 to about 17
February 1945, at and in the vicinity of the Manila Hotel, Manila, brutally
mistreating, and detaining without food, water, medical care or other
essential facilities and supplies, John Vincent JAMES, Erlinda QUERUBIN,
and more than 2,000 other persons, including men, women and children, all
unarmed noncombatant civilians; stealing from such 'civilians watches,
jewelry, and other personal property; and deliberately and without mili-
tary necessity exposing said civilians to gunfire and other hazards,
with consequent killing or wounding of a l.trge number thereof.
92. During the months of January and February 1945, in and at
the vicinity of Manila, assassinating, attempting t<> Lnat •, and
treacherously wounding or killing and attempting to wound or kill, ; ra-
bers of armed forces of the United Slater, of America.
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93. On about 3 February 1945, in the vicinity of the Dy-Pac
Lumberyard, Juan Luna Street, Tond'o, Manila, brutally mistreat in,; and
killing, without cause or trial, Alberto ANTONIO, Arturo ANTONIO, Cecilia
ANTONIO, Dominador ANTONIO, and 111 other men, women and children, all
unarmed noncombatant civilians; and brutally mistreating, torturing,
wounding, maiming, and attempting to kill, all without cuase or trial,
Jose LACSON, Ricardo MSNDOZA, Ricardo SAN JUAN, and Ricardo TRINIDAD, all
unarmed noncombatant civilians.
94. On about 3 February 1945, at Old Bilibid Prison, Manila, then
in use by armed forces of- Japan as a place of internment of unarmed non-
combatant civilians, deliberately and without military justification
installing and maintaining therein military weapons and objectives, and
unnecessarily exposing the internees to gunfire and other hazards.
95. "During the period from about 3 February to about 12 February
1945, in Manila, bombarding and attacking, without military justification,
Old Bilibid Prison Camp, then an undefended, nonmilitary locality housing
a large number of unarmed noncombatant civilians there interned.
96. On about 3 and 4 February 1945, at and in the vicinity of
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal Province, brutal mistreatment and
killing, without cause or trial, of more than 47 unarmed noncombatant
civilians.
97. During the period from about 4 February 1945 to about 7
February 1945, at and in the vicinity of Manila Cathedral, Intramuros,
Manila, brutal mistreatment and abuse of civilian women; and the deliber-
ate and wanton destruction, without military justification, of Manila
Cathedral, an institution devoted exclusively to religious purposes.
9S.. On about 10 February 1945, in and in the vicinity of the
German Club, on San Luis Street near San Marcelino Street, in Ermita,
Manila, brutally mistreating, torturing, mutilating and killing, without
cause or trial, Ada ARTIGAS, Rafael ARTIGAS, Tony ARTIGAS, Feiisa BAO,
Emilio BUENO. Gonzalo BUENO, Fernardino CALU3, SR., .Bernardino CALU3, JR.,
Bulchand DHANAMAL, and more than 500 other men, women and children, includ-
ing American, Filipino, French, Spanish, British-Indian, and German s'iib - •
jects, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; brutally mistreating, torturing,
wounding, maiming, and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Francisco
LOPEZ, Engracio LOSA, Asuncion R. M^RBAS, Helena RCDRICUEZ, and Inez
STRZEGAN, and other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; deliber-
ately contaminating and poisoning a well of water, the sole source of
potable drinking water for a large number of civilians; repeatedly raping
numerous civilian women and female children; deliberately and wantonly,
without military necessity, devastating, burning aaJ destroying the said
German Club and other buildings nearby, together with the furniture, fix-
tures and contents thereof, and other private property.
99. On about 10 February 19'>3, at the Ur. PRICE House, 533
Colorado Street, Ermita, Manila, brutal massacre and killing, without
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cause or trial, of Concepcion ALTAVAS, Enrique ARRASTIA, Dolores Sastiua
BARTA, George BARTA, and more than .100 other men, women and children, all
unarmed noncombatant civilians; brutal mistreatment and woundinj of, and
attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Adoracion AGOSAJOS, Elvira
ALTAVAS, Jose C. BARTA, and more than ten other persons, all unarmed non-
combatant civilians; deliberately and wantonly, without military justi-
fication, burning and destroying houses and other private property.
100. On about 10 February 1945, at Manila, bombarding and attack-
ing, without military justification, Santo Tomas Internment Camp, then a
nonmilitary locality housing a large number of unarmed noncombatant
civilians there interned.
101. On about 11 February 1945, at and in the vicinity of the
Tabacalera Cigar and Cigarette Factory and the Shell Service Station,
Isaac Peral and M. de Comillas Streets, Ermita, Manila, brutal mistreat-
ment and killing, without cause or trial, of Lu Fu CHIN, Dcninga SEDRO,
Hee CHUA, Hung SO, and 39 other unarmed noncombatant civilians; brutal
mistreatment of and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, Bernardo
ANGELES, Chi Chang WONG, and ten other unarmed noncombatant civilians.
102. On about 11 February 1945, in the Pasay District, Rizal,
brutal mistreatment, torture, and burning alive of Fcdro, last name unknown,
an unarmed noncombatant civilian; brutal mistreatment and kill in,-,, with-
out cause or trial, Dr. Luis REYES and Maria SEQUERA, both unarmed non-
combatant civilians; attempting to kill, without cause or trial, numerous
unarmed noncombatant civilians, names unknown; deliberately and wantonly,
without military justification, devastating, burning and destroying houses
and other property.
103. On about 13 February 1945, in the vicinity of the intersec-
tion of Vermont Street, and Florida Street, .Malate, Manila, brutally kill-
ing, without cause or trial, Felix ISLA, Angel FRANCISCO, and three (3)
other unarmed noncombatant civilians; wounding and attempting to kill,
without cause or trial, Silverio T. BRAGAMZA. •
104. On about 17 February 1945, at 417 Isaac Peral Street, Manila,
brutally mistreating, torturing and killing, without cause or trial, Carlos
Garcia BUCK, Asuncion CEDRON, Maria Luisa C. de CHIC072, Prudencio CHICOTE,
JR., Aurora de la CRUZ, Carlitos de la CRUZ, Cabrieia c!e la CRUZ, Loiica
de la CRUZ, ana more than 30 other men, women and children, and brutally
mistreating, wounding and attempt in;; to kill, without cause or trial,
Trudencio CHICOTE, Victorio FERLA, Florentina E. H.' CONZALEZ, Mary GONZALEZ,
Carlos GARCIA, JR., Pelegia LARAYA, and more than 25 other :aen, voaon and
children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians; and deliberately and inton-
ly burning and destroying private property without military justification.
105. On about 24 February 1945, at and iii the vicinity Oi
Pablo, City of San Pablo, Laguna Province, brutally aistrcatlni; and kill-
ing, without cause or trial, 730 men, women and children, all cnai
'combatant civilians; brutally mistreating, vounJin.-. and at! King Co kill
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without cause or trial, Yat Tek SE, Tan Tek CHU, Sia Suy SENG, and other
unarmed nonccmbatant civilians.
106. During the month of February 1945, exact date unknown, at
Nichols Field, Rizal Province, brutally beating and killing, without
cause or trial, a member of the armed forces of the United States of
America, name unknown, then held as a prisoner of war by armed forces of
Japan.
107. During the months of February and March 1945, in and in the
vicinity of the City of 3aguio, Mountain Province, deliberately and wan-
tonly and without military justification devastating, burning and destroy-
ing private and public property, looting, and stealing from civilians food
and other personal property.
108. On about 25 March 1945, at the Town of Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya Province, brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial,
more than i.4 unarmed nonccmbatant civilians, names unknown.
109. On about 26 March 1945, at Cebu City, Cebu Province, brutally
mistreating, torturing and killing, without cause or trial, Paul MANSELLA,
Lawrence FOX, and SCOTT, full name unknown, all members of armed forces
of the United States of America then held captive as prisoners of war by
armed forces of Japan; brutally mistreating, torturing and killing, with-
out cause or trial, Roberto TAN and four (4) other men, all unarmed, non-
combatant civilians.
110. On about 29 March 1945, at the Town of Famy, Laguna Province,
brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial, unarmed non-
combatant civilians.
111. During the month of March 1945, exact d3te unknown, at the
Town of Bayombong, Nuava Vizc3ya Province, brutally mistreating and kill-
ing, without cause or trial, VELASQUES and MACA3AD3AD, first nases
unknown, and more than 27 other persons, all unarmed ncncombatant civilians.
112. During the month of March 1945, at Cebu City, Cebu Province,
brutal mistreatment and massacre, without cause or trial, of twelve mem-
bers of the PALICTE Family, and other persons, ail unarmed noncombatant
civilians; multiple rape of civilian women; deliberate and wanton devasta-
tion, burning, and destruction, without military justification, pillage
and looting of large areas of that City.
113. On about 7 April 1945, at and in the vicinity of the Barrios
of Pingas, Ulinig, Liko, and Santa Ana, and the Municipality of Paete,
all in Laguna Province, brutal mistreatment and massacre, without cause or
trial, of Aura ADAO, Juan ADAO, Estanislawa ADAO, Damaso AI-'UNCOL, Mil itv;
ASTRONIMO, Grc-orio BAGUI, Maria SALCEDO, Marcosa VALENCIA, and aore than
50 other men, women and children, and wounding and attempting to kill,
without cause or trial, Mateo ADES, Meliton BALQUEDRA, Ernesto BALQUIEDRA,
Aurora VALENCIA, and other persons, all unarmed noncorabatant civil: ,.,.;




114. On about 16 April 1945, at Nanipil, Mountain Province, delib-
erately, wantonly, and without military justification, burning and destroy-
ing the settlement, together with numerous items of personal property;
and killing, without cause or trial, Alico PABLON'OT and other persons, all
unarmed noncombatant civilians.
115. On about 16 April 1945, in the vicinity of Titig Mountain,
Mountain Province, brutally mistreating and beheading, without cause or
trial, Alphonso SUNGA, Lino GA3LAD, Jose BANZZ, Soledad RAMOS, Pedro LA
MADRID, and other persons, and maiming and attempting to kill, without
cause or trial, Juanito ALIMES, Samuel TOVERA, and other persons, all
unarmed noncombatant ' civilians.
116. On about 13 April 1945, near the City of Baguio, Mountain
Province, brumal mistreatment and killing, without cause, or trial, of 83
men, women and children, and wounding and attempting to kill Marcelo
ARRIETA and other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
117. On about 10 May 1945, at o'r. in the vicinity of Basco, Batan
Island, Batanes Group, torturing and killing, without cause or trial,
Januario VAL02JES and other persons, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
118. On about 10 May 1945, at Matina Pangi, Davao City, Mindanao
Island, brutally mistreating and killing, without cause or trial,
Herculano GEMPESAW, Hermes GEMPESAW, Arestes GEMPESAW, Carlos PINGOL,
Manuel BONLEON, Antonio PAMILAR, Corazon PAMILAR, Felccio BONLECW,
Felecitas GEMPESAW, Maria GEMPESAW, Clara GEMPSSAW, Purificacion GEMPESAW,
Eduardo PIKGOL, and other persons, all noncombatant civilians.
119. During the period from about 1 May 1945 to about 1
September 1945, on Batan Island, Batanes Group, brutally mistreating,
torturing, killing and attempting to kill, without cause or trial, unarmed
noncombatant civilians; wantonly and without military justification
devastating, burning and destroying homes and other property; confisca-
ting and stealing food, crops, and other supplies essential to the sur-
vival of civilians.
120. During the period from about 30 June 1945 to 4 July 1945,
both dates inclusive, at Tapal , Cagayan Province, brutal mistreatment,
massacre and killing without cause or trial, of more than 200 men, women,
and children, and brutal mistreatment, wounding and attempting to kill,
without cause or trial, of more than 50 men, -..omen and children, all unarmed
noncombatant civilians.
121. On about 10 July 1945, at Basco, Batan Island, Batanes Croup,
torturing and killing, without cause or trial, more than oi men, woaen,
and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians.
122. On about 20 January 1945, at Los Banos Internaent Caap,
Laguna Province, killing, without cause or trial, Patri ' l->, >!
known as Patrick HELL, a nonco:r.;.atant civil j'.m. citizen o< the United
'stater, of Auerica, then and there interned by > orccs of Japan.
123. During the month of January l'V-5, al and in the . 1 . tnity d
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the City of Iloilo, Panay Island, brutally mistreating and killing, with-
out cause or trial, Crispino UMADKAY, Ju3n GOLING, MASIONG, full name
unknown, Imay, full name unknown, and other persons, all unarmed noncom-
batant civilians; on about 22 March 1945, at and in the vicinity of the
City of Iloilo, Panay Island, brutally mistreating and killing, without
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